DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.12.174938

Authors: Michael Alexeev, Robert Conrad

Abstract: This paper analyzes the evolution of tax systems in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union during the transition from centrally planned to market economies. Its main objective is to identify the principal directions of tax reform from the beginning of liberalization in 1989 to the stabilization of the basic tax structures by the mid-2000s. The paper combines comparative institutional analysis with country evidence on the reform of the value-added tax, personal and corporate income taxation, excises, tariffs, and property taxation. Particular attention is paid to the role of technical assistance, the sequencing of reforms, and the interaction between tax design and administrative capacity. The analysis shows that pre-reform tax systems were largely incompatible with market allocation and modern revenue administration because they operated mainly as accounting devices within state-controlled economies. During the transition, the VAT became the central instrument of reform, while income taxation had to be redesigned to reflect the growing role of private ownership and the need to coordinate individual and corporate tax treatment. Excise taxation and tariffs were gradually aligned with international practice, and property taxation developed more slowly because of institutional weaknesses in cadastres, valuation, and local administration. Although reform paths differed across countries, the long-run outcome was convergence toward a broadly similar tax model centered on the VAT, income taxation, selective excises, and an emerging local property tax. The paper concludes that successful tax reform required not only legislative change but also administrative modernization, public understanding, and adaptation to country-specific institutional constraints. The experience of the region illustrates the importance of revenue-oriented reform, implementation capacity, and learning by doing in periods of systemic economic transformation.

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DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.12.175160

Authors: Marek Dabrowski

Abstract: The decentralized model of a communist economy based on autonomous state-owned or socially owned enterprises exposed to market signals (market socialism) was a response to the inefficiencies of the traditional model of a centrally planned economy, first introduced in the Soviet Union at the end of the 1920s and early 1930s. Market socialism was implemented in Yugoslavia from 1950 and in Hungary from 1968, bringing mixed results. A few other countries also tried this model, but either rolled back the reform soon after it began (Czechoslovakia in 1968–1969) or implemented it in a fragmentary and inconsistent way (Poland in the 1980s, the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s), without positive results. The main obstacles to the implementation of this model had a political character, because it challenged the totalitarian character of a communist regime and the hegemonic position of the communist party. Only after the collapse of communist regimes in the late 1980s and early 1990s could genuine market reforms begin, but the concept of market socialism became useless.

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DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.11.158982

Authors: Marina S. Dolmatova, Tatiana S. Remizova

Abstract: Climate change mitigation increasingly relies on carbon pricing as a core policy tool. This study investigates the applicability of such mechanisms within the Russian context, given the country’s heavy fossil fuel dependence and evolving energy landscape. A mixed-method approach is used, combining case studies (EU ETS, Nordic carbon taxes, Sakhalin pilot) with scenario modeling based on macroeconomic data. The findings suggest that although carbon pricing can drive renewable adoption and emissions reduction, Russia’s centralized governance, regional inequality, and export dependence pose challenges. Key recommendations include phased implementation of carbon taxes and emissions trading, equitable revenue allocation, and integration with existing tax systems. With current limitations including reliance on secondary data and uncertainty in political feasibility, future research should explore public acceptance and institutional readiness. Overall, carbon pricing offers Russia a structured pathway to decarbonization, aligning with global climate goals if carefully adapted to local conditions.

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DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.11.142169

Authors: Mirzobobo Yormirzoev, Amina Ayombekova

Abstract: This paper explores how the health-related component of human capital affects economic performance in all five Central Asian countries. In particular, it analyzes the impact of life expectancy on overall GDP and output per worker, which characterizes labor productivity. The time frame includes the period from 2000 to 2021. The methodology is based on a standard growth accounting framework. Findings show that better health conditions, as indicated by the increase in life expectancy, have a significant impact on the productivity of a worker. Nonetheless, its contribution to total output growth remains relatively small. In contrast, capital investment plays a crucial role in boosting labor productivity and fostering economic growth, especially in capital intensive countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

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DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.9.97916

Authors: Yigitali Zokirov, Daichi Yamada, Masato Hiwatari

Abstract: This study examines the relationship between competition and innovation of Russian firms. We mainly explore (i) the role of competition in stimulating or suppressing product and process innovation and (ii) if the relationship is affected by institutional conditions, such as court fairness, corruption, and informal competition. The results show that innovation, particularly process innovation, has an inverted U-shaped relationship with competition but that product innovation is negatively associated with competition. Further, the negative relationship with product innovation is observed only among firms confronting problems in institutional conditions. The results imply that, whereas the promotion of competition can both encourage and discourage innovation, depending on the initial competition level, an improvement in institutional conditions can mitigate the negative effect of competition on innovation.

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DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.8.95949

Authors: Leonid M. Grigoryev, Ekaterina A. Kheifets

Abstract: In 2020 the energy transition path was distorted by the COVID-19 pandemic which caused a sharp economic decline and a fast global recovery in 2021. Unlike that period, the years between 2001 and 2019 illustrated a different type of energy evolution for developed and developing countries regarding primary energy consumption. During this period the composition of energy balances of these two major groups demonstrated dramatic disparity, notably marked by the high share of coal in developing countries. The shock of 2020 led to a belief in expediting the transition to green energy, but in 2021 the economic recovery revived demand for oil and coal, dashing hopes for the growing renewable energy sources sector in the European Union that year. The return of coal, however, to the EU energy sector and stable demand for motor fuel globally led to the restoration of the GHG emission growth against the backdrop of the climate policy implementation failure. The current energy transition is denoted by features such as the flat oil demand in developed countries, the flat global demand for motor gasoline and the growing demand for diesel. The econometrics of demand for two motor oil products are quite opposite. For gasoline we have almost all hypotheses met: the negative influence of climate policy and oil prices, strong effect of dummies for shock of 2020 and 2021, and naturally 0.3 coefficient at GDP growth rate. Nevertheless, for diesel everything is exactly the opposite — only 0,4 coefficient at GDP and practically nothing else. This effect shows the strong role and trend for cargo use of diesel fueled trucks in the global economy. The high income of oil and gas majors in 2021 did not secure the investment upturn. A mature oil industry receives substantial profits for its investors, supplying dividends, and buying back debts without enlarging production capacities. At this point climate policy expectations of phasing out fossil fuels in the foreseeable future operated as a braking mechanism against reinvesting oil incomes. Moreover, at this junction we can observe governments’ limited capacity to pursue policies toward multiple objectives simultaneously: modest energy prices, energy transition and securing the sufficient capital formation for energy. The continued fusion of the economic upturn and energy transition will be dependent on demand and supply matching in the oil markets. It is also possible that the sanctions policies of 2022 may aggravate the situation, triggering high prices and uncertainties.

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DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.8.90948

Authors: Simon Commander, Ruta Prieskienyte

Abstract: Can autocracies and their associated institutions successfully implement economic policies that promote growth and investment? Can “good economics” somehow offset the effects of “bad” politics? Kazakhstan is a case where an autocratic regime has actively projected market-friendly policies and attracted significant amounts of incoming investment. These policies are to some extent reflected in the country’s governance ratings, although there has been a significant amount of investment disputes that question the attachment to the rule of law. Moreover, the political regime has remained strongly personalized around the founder President, his family and associates. This is reflected in the economics­ of the autocracy whereby a large public sector and a set of privately held businesses coexist to mutual benefit. The latter have been formed around a very small number of highly connected individuals whose initial accumulation of assets allows them also to act as necessary gatekeepers for entrants. Competition as a result remains limited in both economic and political domains. Yet, uncertainties over the future leadership, along with latent rivalry over access to resources and markets, make the political equilibrium quite fragile, as the events of January 2022 have underlined. In short, “bad” politics both squeezes the space for, and distorts the benefits from, “good” economics. At the same time, the limits of “good” economics are reflected in the extraordinary concentrations of ownership, control and wealth that have occurred.

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DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.8.90947

Authors: Marek Dabrowski

Abstract: The paper contains a retrospective analysis of macroeconomic policy and reforms in the countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) from 1992 to 2021, after obtaining political and economic independence in 1991. Special attention is given to problems of macroeconomic stabilization and economic growth. As a result of structural distortions inherited from the Soviet economy and the slow pace of economic and institutional reforms, the FSU countries suffered from a long and deep output decline in the 1990s. Their post-transition growth recovery in the 2000s did not last long. Furthermore, they remain vulnerable to both domestic and external economic shocks. Given the limited predictability of post-COVID global economic trends and the damaging consequences of the war in Ukraine, this vulnerability will likely continue in the next couple of years.

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DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.6.58683

Authors: Leonid M. Grigoryev, Dzhanneta D. Medzhidova

Abstract: The international community has become increasingly concerned with sustainable development and particularly with preventing climate change. The COVID-19 pandemic and global recession of 2020 will exacerbate the situation not just for 2020–2021, but for many years to come. Sadly, it is a game-changer. The necessity to solve problems of poverty (energy poverty) and inequality, as well as growth and climate change mitigation, now haunts intellectuals, forecasters, and politicians. These three problems constitute the global energy trilemma (GET). There is a wide range of forecasts, scenarios, and political plans emerging after the Paris Agreement in 2015. They demonstrate concerns about the slow progress on the matter; however, they still increase the goals for 2030–2050. The global capital formation is a key tool for changes while also representing the hard-budget investment constraints. This article examines practical features of recent trends in energy, poverty, and climate change mitigation, arguing that allocation and coordinated management of sufficient financial resources are vital for a simultaneous solution of GET. No group of countries can hope to solve each of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) separately. The global economy has reached the point where it has an urgent need for cooperation.

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DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.5.49296

Authors: Ben Slay, Tahmina Anvarova

Abstract: This paper focuses on how questions of inequalities in middle-income countries in Europe and Central Asia are dealt with in three recent studies: the EBRD’s “Transition Report 2016–17”; the World Bank’s 2018 study “Toward a new social contract: Taking on distributional tensions in Europe and Central Asia”; and UNDP’s “Regional human development report 2016. Progress at risk: Inequalities and human development in Eastern Europe, Turkey, and Central Asia.” While the three studies differ in terms of objectives, conceptual frameworks, country coverage, data and indicators, and policy recommendations, they also share important commonalities — particularly in terms of creating “regional” inequality narratives for transition economies, reconciling official data with common perceptions of inequalities in the region; improving data quality, quantity and availability, and changes in tax and social policies.

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DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.5.47348

Authors: Leonid M. Grigoryev, Lyubov Popovets

Abstract: Sociology and psychology closely study the phenomena of homicide and suicide among countries of the world, but both remain little studied in the context of the levels of countries’ development and international comparisons. Developed countries (in terms of GDP per capita) show a decrease in the relative rate of homicides, but the case of suicides is not so explicit. This paper examines the relative levels of suicides and homicides all around the world in the context of socio-economic indices as well as indicators of mental health among the population. Addressing the example of the BRICS countries, the authors discuss the impact of economic imbalances on homicide and suicide levels. The analysis demonstrates that social inequality determines cross-country differences for relative levels in terms of homicide rates, including the course of events in the post-Soviet countries. And in the case of Russia, it is possible to make a conclusion not only about the presence of deep inter-regional differences, but also about a large-scale reduction in the frequency of two tragic phenomena between 2000 and 2017 during the economic recovery.

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DOI: 10.1016/j.ruje.2017.09.006

Authors: Shigeki Ono

Abstract: This paper examines the finance-growth nexus in Russia with the vector autoregression model, taking oil prices and foreign exchange rates into account. The analyzed period is from 1999 through 2008 (Subperiod 1) and from 2009 through 2014 (Subperiod 2). The results for Subperiod 1 suggest that there is causality from economic growth to money supply and bank lending, which implies demand-following responses. The results for Subperiod 2 show that economic growth Granger causes bank lending while there is no causality from money supply to economic growth, which could be related to the dramatic decrease in the amount of intervention in foreign exchange markets.

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DOI: 10.1016/j.ruje.2017.06.002

Authors: Alexander Abramov, Alexander Radygin, Revold Entov, Maria Chernova

Abstract: This study examines the influence of state participation in the ownership structure of companies on their financial efficiency using a sample of 114 largest companies in Russia. As an indirect indicator of efficiency, we used a variety of financial indicators: revenue per employee (gross margin), return on equity, profit margin and debt burden. The effects of direct and indirect state ownership are considered separately. Using econometric analysis, we conclude that the dominance of the block of shares owned by the state has a negative effect on the performance characteristics, and its increase is associated with an increase in the debt burden of the companies. According to our criteria, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) perform worse on average than private companies. The mechanism of how changes in the “real sector” affect profitability is examined particularly closely. The study shows that a change in the profitability of private companies is characterized by a significant dependence on the movement of labor productivity characteristics. At the same time, for SOEs, a similar correlation was not revealed. These companies demonstrated no visible relationship between their profitability and performance characteristics. The study shows that increases in the size of direct government ownership lead to lower labor productivity and profitability; the impact of indirect ownership is, seemingly, more complicated.

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DOI: 10.1016/j.ruje.2017.02.001

Authors: Alexander Abramov, Alexander Radygin, Maria Chernova

Abstract: This article analyzes the ownership structure of state-owned companies and their role in the Russian economy. Using a sample of 114 of the largest Russian companies, we estimated direct and indirect state participation as a percentage of shareholdings for direct and indirect federal property during the time period of 2006–2014. We used two methods to estimate the role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which allowed us to compare our results with OECD and Rosstat statistics for a broader sample of Russian companies owned by the public sector. This study revealed a decline in SOEs’ share in the capitalization of the Russian stock market and a slight increase in their share of total revenues and employment. The results indicated that public SOEs demonstrated significantly higher productivity compared to non-public SOEs and private companies had a distinct advantage in productivity compared with public SOEs. Despite the significant advantages in productivity of private companies over the SOEs, over a 9-year period, we observed that this gap narrowed. This may be due to conditions of high financial volatility and stagnation of the economy that result in certain advantages for SOEs in terms of access to sources of long-term funding and other forms of state support. However, SOEs with indirect state control experienced a rapid growth in revenue and productivity compared to other firms. This may indicate the presence of a specific stock selection mechanism for transferring more effective SOEs from direct state ownership to indirect control as an alternative to privatization.

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DOI: 10.1016/j.ruje.2016.11.002

Authors: Evsey Gurvich

Abstract: This article is an attempt to find a grounded answer to the question of why many large-scale economic development programs worked out in Russia from 2000 through 2010 have failed to yield the expected results. To this end, the author has diagnosed the Russian economy, including a comparative analysis against 20 countries at similar levels of development and analyzed both the Russian and global experience in developing and implementing economic programs. The author concludes that the development of the Russian economy is currently hindered by a rigid institutional framework and that growth cannot accelerate without removing it as part of the political process. Based on the analysis of various types of institutional reforms, specific measures are proposed that can ensure the country's evolutional development and can mitigate the economic and social risks threatening Russia if the status quo is maintained.

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DOI: 10.1016/j.ruje.2016.06.003

Authors: Andrei Yakovlev

Abstract: Contrary to the focus on the events of the last two years (2014–2015) associated with the accession of Crimea to Russia and military conflict in Eastern Ukraine, in this study, I stress that serious changes in Russian domestic policy (with strong pressure on political opposition, state propaganda and sharp anti-Western rhetoric, as well as the fight against “foreign agents’) became visible in 2012. Geopolitical ambitions to revise the “global order” (introduced by the USA after the collapse of the USSR) and the increased role of Russia in “global governance” were declared by leaders of the country much earlier, with Vladimir Putin's famous Munich speech in 2007. These ambitions were based on the robust economic growth of the mid-2000s, which encouraged the Russian ruling elite to adopt the view that Russia (with its huge energy resources) is a new economic superpower. In this paper, I will show that the concept of “Militant Russia” in a proper sense can be attributed rather to the period of the mid-2000s. After 2008–2009, the global financial crisis and, especially, the Arab Spring and mass political protests against electoral fraud in Moscow in December 2011, the Russian ruling elite made mostly “militant” attempts to defend its power and assets.

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DOI: 10.1016/j.ruje.2016.06.001

Authors: Silvana Malle

Abstract: This paper argues that Russia has embarked on a difficult path to economic sovereignty and heightened security to withstand rising antagonism from the West that culminated with the application of punitive sanctions against Russia's positioning on Ukraine. With the aim of lessening economic dependence on trade with the EU, its major trade partner for decades, Russia tries to work out a patriotic model of growth based on two vectors: import and trade partner substitution. The pursuit of self-sufficiency in foodstuffs adds an important pillar to security concerns as reflected earlier in the 2010 Doctrine on Food Security. But import substitution will be costly and difficult to manage. Fiscal balances and exchange rates will need to adjust to the new challenges. Finding new partners eastwards is also complicated. Trade with China, in hydrocarbons or other commodities, requires massive infrastructural work that neither the government nor private investors can afford in a situation of financial stringency. Investment from China is slow to materialize as the economic slowdown also impinges on China's projects. Nonetheless important deals on gas and infrastructure have been agreed and are pursued despite difficulties. A favourable institutional framework aimed at attracting investors to the Far East is in place. It will be up to the local administrations to make the best of it and venture capital to run the risk. The outlook is long-term, but both Russia and China have learnt from history to be patient.

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DOI: 10.1016/j.ruje.2016.04.003

Authors: Nadia Vanteeva

Abstract: This paper argues that Russia's choice of economic organization, which is based on the renewed role of the state, is a response to the existence of severe transaction costs, and subsequent mitigation of contractual incompleteness in the absence of a strong property rights system. Ill-defined property rights have historically hampered formation of business classes in Russia, reducing the necessity for appropriate market infrastructure. This also implied that if Russia's political and economic system had more than one competing hierarchy, the objective of the elites would not have entailed long-term economic growth, as gains from short-term wealth tunneling would have been much larger. As in the early 2000s Russian investment projects were generally defined by large sunk costs and long-term to maturity, under a weak legal system a new substitute governing mechanism, which took form of the state–private co-partnership system, has arisen in order to reduce hold-up costs leading to high levels of underinvestment.

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DOI: 10.1016/j.ruje.2015.12.003

Authors: Leonid Grigoryev

Abstract: The demand for law on the part of the society (business, middle class, civil society) is not sufficient at the transformation stage — the reciprocal demand for law from the power elite is necessary. Contemporary theory states that in the contrary case the pressure on elites would require a more open regime of participation. In order to strengthen the positions of the power elite in the long-run it is necessary to limit endless redistribution of assets and introduce the common rule for all.

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DOI: 10.1016/j.ruje.2015.05.001

Authors: Alexander Radygin, Yury Simachev, Revold Entov

Abstract: This article will analyze the activity of state-owned companies and their place in the structure of market relations from the standpoint of contemporary approaches to the study of “state failure” and “market failure”. It will also consider the implications of the systematic embedding of private property rights. In addition to considering the costs of the functions of state-owned companies, the authors address the actual experience of the Russian economy in the present day, the experience of forming state corporations and the risks associated with their operation. Particular attention will be paid to the inhibition of incentives to improve the general institutional environment and, conversely, to the increasing incidence of direct state intervention in matters that affect economic development. We will examine the various ways in which the growth of the public sector, de jure and de facto, reduces opportunities for implementing private property rights.

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DOI: 10.1016/j.ruje.2015.05.003

Authors: Vladimir Mau, Alexey Ulyukaev

Abstract: Global crisis forms new economic policy agenda which raises new questions for economic theory and economic thinking. This paper deals with these new intellectual challenges. Among them: growth theory and the risks of secular stagnation, unconventional macroeconomic policy and the prospects of financial stability, inequality and growth, the new welfare state, the prospects of globalization vs. de-globalization, and the re-industrialization in advanced economies. Based on the analysis of global trends, the paper discusses the roots and features of current Russian economic problems, compares the 2008–2009 and 2014–2015 crises, and factorizes the last one on three main components. The analysis includes the effects of sanctions against Russia on the current economic situation and the structural problems that slow down economic growth. Special attention is paid to examples of medium-term and long-term steps that can provide sustainable development for the Russian economy.

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