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Research Article
Russian Journal of Economics 6(3): 219-238
https://doi.org/10.32609/j.ruje.6.56362 (25 Sep 2020)
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  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Major provisions of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law
    • 2.1. Sanctions
    • 2.2. Enforcement
  • 3. Administrative monopolies and Fair Competition Review
  • 4. The role of economics in antitrust in China
    • 4.1. Definition of relevant market
    • 4.2. Use of economics in prohibiting monopoly agreements
    • 4.3. Role of economics in abuse of market dominance cases
    • 4.3.1. The Qualcomm case (2015)
    • 4.3.2. The Tetra Pak case (2016)
    • 4.3.3. Provincial AML enforcers and the Eastman case (2019)
    • 4.4. The role of economic analysis in merger review
    • 4.4.1. Economic theories for competition review of horizontal mergers in China
    • 4.4.2. Economic framework for assessing non-horizontal mergers in China
  • 5. Private actions and acceptance of economic evidence in courts
    • 5.1. Stand-alone cases
    • 5.2. Follow-on cases and further discussion on RPM
  • 6. Challenges and concluding remarks
  • References
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