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  • Article InfoArticle Info
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  • Article title
  • Abstract
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  • 1. Introduction
  • 2. Literature review
  • 3. The model
    • 3.1. The intuition
    • 3.2. Assumptions
    • 3.3. Values of strategies
      • A. Not collude or cooperate (N)
      • B. Collude and not reveal (CNR)
      • C. Collude and reveal (CR)
      • D. Deviate and not reveal (DNR)
      • E. Deviate and reveal (DR)
      • F. Cooperate and not reveal (COOPNR)
      • G. Cooperate and reveal (COOPR)
    • 3.4. Subgame perfect equilibria
  • 4. Results and discussion
    • 4.1. Characterization of subgame perfect equilibria
    • 4.2. Impact of type I errors
    • 4.3. Effect of leniency on the incentives to cooperate
  • 5. Discussion
    • 5.1. Leniency and corruption
    • 5.2. Leniency and compliance
  • 6. Conclusions
  • Acknowledgements
  • To find the subgame perfect equilibria, we need to find the conditions for α and p that make each of the strategies dominant
  • References
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