DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.6.48556

Authors: Sharofiddin Ashurov, Anwar Hasan Abdullah Othman, Romzie Bin Rosman, Razali Bin Haron

Abstract: Foreign direct investment (FDI) is viewed as one of the most crucial forms of capital inflows and significant drivers of economic growth in numerous countries. In particular, developing countries, emerging economies and countries engaged in the process of development have recognized the crucial importance of FDI as a critical contributor to their economic progress and increasing economic opportunities. The following research investigated and identified the determinants of FDI in the Central Asian countries, specifically Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, between 2000 and 2017. The methodology employed in the first part included comparative analysis of the foreign investment trends and gross domestic product (GDP), as well as an endogenous growth model. The result showed that five variables are robustly significant of FDI determinants: FDI (previous year), GDP, labor force, trade openness and tax. Additionally, this paper demonstrates that among the most significant FDI contributors are China, Russia and Japan as well as European countries because of the economic opportunities available; however, the USA is considered by Central Asian countries to offer the most opportunities for security control considerations rather than economic opportunities. Furthermore, the results suggest that the authorities in the Central Asia region should enhance the stability of their economic growth, labor force, trade openness and tax regulations to attract more FDI to the region.

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DOI: 10.3897/j.ruje.4.33622

Authors: Kirill Bukin, Mark Levin

Abstract: This paper is an extension of the recent work by the authors where a simplifying assumption of no costs of entry to the religious market was set. In the present paper, the religious market is regulated in the sense that a sect in order to establish itself in a market has to bear costs of entry. In the case of one official denomination the strict sect attracts less flock, and the monopoly church will acquire more church-goers and even marginally religious people will hesitate between joining the church and staying nonreligious. In case of prohibitively high costs the sect will shrink to zero and the church will take control over almost all population with the remaining small group of nonbelievers. A comparative statics problem in the case of the two official churches was also considered. In stage one of the game these churches choose their position in the strictness interval with the subsequent emergence of sects. The more costly is entry the less populated will be the strict sect and even the moderate sect will turn more liberal with the loss of some of its members.

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