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            <title>Latest Articles from Russian Journal of Economics</title>
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		    <title>Platformization without platform data: A latent variable approach</title>
		    <link>https://rujec.org/article/180870/</link>
		    <description><![CDATA[
					<p>Russian Journal of Economics 12(2): 199-229</p>
					<p>DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.12.180870</p>
					<p>Authors: Alexander M. Karminsky, Nikolay V. Voytov</p>
					<p>Abstract: Digital multi-sided platforms intermediate a growing share of household expenditure, yet direct cross-country measurement of platformization remains infeasible owing to the absence of publicly available data. This paper treats platformization — defined as the ratio of household consumption expenditure intermediated by platforms to total consumer spending — as a latent variable and estimates it using a Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model for a panel of 86 countries over 2000–2023, drawing on the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The selection of causal and reflective variables is grounded in the Aghion–Howitt endogenous growth model, operationalizing the creative destruction mechanism in the context of platform economics. The methodological contribution consists in applying a Mundlak decomposition within the MIMIC specification, separating short-run (within-country) and long-run (between-country) determinants of platformization while preserving the random-effects structure required for latent variable identification. Bootstrap analysis and leave-one-country-out procedures identify a robust core of determinants: financial depth, broadband access, regulatory quality, urbanization, and R&amp;D expenditure (the latter exhibiting a negative between-effect interpreted as a crowding-out effect: countries with lower average R&amp;D intensity exhibit higher platformization because they are recipients of platform technologies originating in a small number of R&amp;D-intensive exporting economies). Country-level estimates reveal conditional β-convergence alongside persistent absolute gaps among income groups, consistent with technology diffusion under institutional heterogeneity. The resulting estimates are benchmarked against independent point estimates from the literature and can serve as a basis for cross-country comparison of platformization levels and assessment of long-run regulatory effects.</p>
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		    <category>Research Article</category>
		    <pubDate>Tue, 30 Jun 2026 18:00:03 +0000</pubDate>
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		    <title>How should public investment be structured to avoid the crowding-out effect on private investment? Valuable lessons from the Russian economy for Vietnam</title>
		    <link>https://rujec.org/article/134875/</link>
		    <description><![CDATA[
					<p>Russian Journal of Economics 11(3): 349-380</p>
					<p>DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.11.134875</p>
					<p>Authors: Mayya V. Dubovik, Irina P. Komarova, Dinh Trong An</p>
					<p>Abstract: After each economic crisis, such as the recent COVID-19 pandemic, governments have used public investment as a crucial tool to help economies recover quickly. However, a significant concern is how to structure such investments to meet the intended objectives while avoiding risks during implementation. The crowding-in/out effect of public investment on private investment remains a hotly debated topic. To address this issue, the study utilized data from 63 provinces in Vietnam over the period from 2000 to 2023. Through the use of the Cross-Sectionally Augmented Autoregressive Distributed Lag model (CS-ARDL) model and robustness checks using the Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS) and Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) models, the research demonstrated that public investment has a crowding-in effect on private investment in the long term. Furthermore, the study identified two main causes of public investment crowding out private investment: first, when public investment exceeds the production capacity of the economy, and second, when public investment is inefficient. This conclusion is drawn from the analysis of the Russian economy. Additionally, the study employed the dynamic panel threshold model and found that if the ratio of public investment to GDP in Vietnam exceeds 8.532%, the crowding-out effect on private investment will occur. Moreover, the research also assessed the effectiveness of public investment in the context of climate change to identify shortcomings that need to be addressed immediately. These findings serve as important bases for proposing measures to improve the efficiency of public investment and avoid the crowding-out effect on private investment.</p>
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		    <category>Research Article</category>
		    <pubDate>Tue, 30 Sep 2025 19:00:06 +0000</pubDate>
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		    <title>Decarbonizing Russia: Lessons from global carbon pricing practices</title>
		    <link>https://rujec.org/article/158982/</link>
		    <description><![CDATA[
					<p>Russian Journal of Economics 11(3): 285-305</p>
					<p>DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.11.158982</p>
					<p>Authors: Marina S. Dolmatova, Tatiana S. Remizova</p>
					<p>Abstract: Climate change mitigation increasingly relies on carbon pricing as a core policy tool. This study investigates the applicability of such mechanisms within the Russian context, given the country’s heavy fossil fuel dependence and evolving energy landscape. A mixed-method approach is used, combining case studies (EU ETS, Nordic carbon taxes, Sakhalin pilot) with scenario modeling based on macroeconomic data. The findings suggest that although carbon pricing can drive renewable adoption and emissions reduction, Russia’s centralized governance, regional inequality, and export dependence pose challenges. Key recommendations include phased implementation of carbon taxes and emissions trading, equitable revenue allocation, and integration with existing tax systems. With current limitations including reliance on secondary data and uncertainty in political feasibility, future research should explore public acceptance and institutional readiness. Overall, carbon pricing offers Russia a structured pathway to decarbonization, aligning with global climate goals if carefully adapted to local conditions.</p>
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		    <category>Research Article</category>
		    <pubDate>Tue, 30 Sep 2025 19:00:03 +0000</pubDate>
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		    <title>Health and economic growth in Central Asia</title>
		    <link>https://rujec.org/article/142169/</link>
		    <description><![CDATA[
					<p>Russian Journal of Economics 11(2): 197-214</p>
					<p>DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.11.142169</p>
					<p>Authors: Mirzobobo Yormirzoev, Amina Ayombekova</p>
					<p>Abstract: This paper explores how the health-related component of human capital affects economic performance in all five Central Asian countries. In particular, it analyzes the impact of life expectancy on overall GDP and output per worker, which characterizes labor productivity. The time frame includes the period from 2000 to 2021. The methodology is based on a standard growth accounting framework. Findings show that better health conditions, as indicated by the increase in life expectancy, have a significant impact on the productivity of a worker. Nonetheless, its contribution to total output growth remains relatively small. In contrast, capital investment plays a crucial role in boosting labor productivity and fostering economic growth, especially in capital intensive countries such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.</p>
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		    <category>Research Article</category>
		    <pubDate>Mon, 30 Jun 2025 10:53:50 +0000</pubDate>
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		    <title>﻿﻿Gender inequality in Russia: Axial institutions and agency</title>
		    <link>https://rujec.org/article/94459/</link>
		    <description><![CDATA[
					<p>Russian Journal of Economics 9(1): 71-92</p>
					<p>DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.9.94459</p>
					<p>Authors: Sofia M. Rebrey</p>
					<p>Abstract: This research measures gender inequality in Russia in axial institutions: household and labor markets, education and science, state and corporate governance and relates it to agency, measured on the World Values Survey. Russian women are actively engaged in labor markets, including healthcare, science and other fields, which are widely viewed as male, as a legacy of the Soviet era. The gender income and the wage gap stem from the double burden and “maternity fee.” Demographic policy reinforces women’s role as prime caregivers, multiplies “maternity fee” and increases gender inequality, which consequently lowers the birth rate. Women are highly educated; however, education does not necessarily serve women’s career and success due to patriarchal values in the hidden curriculum. Many women are engaged in science, accounting for 43% of scientific workers, particularly in humanitarian sciences. However, the main reason is low wages. And ­science still functions within patriarchal traditions, while gender and women studies remain heterodox and have low impact on mainstream academic discussion. Governance remains a male field, while women account for deputies, and mostly languish in administrative­ jobs and are only entrusted with decision-making capabilities both in state and corporate governance.</p>
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		    <category>Research Article</category>
		    <pubDate>Thu, 13 Apr 2023 19:00:36 +0000</pubDate>
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		    <title>Oil markets between Scylla of recovery and Charybdis of climate policy</title>
		    <link>https://rujec.org/article/95949/</link>
		    <description><![CDATA[
					<p>Russian Journal of Economics 8(3): 207-233</p>
					<p>DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.8.95949</p>
					<p>Authors: Leonid M. Grigoryev, Ekaterina A. Kheifets</p>
					<p>Abstract: In 2020 the energy transition path was distorted by the COVID-19 pandemic which caused a sharp economic decline and a fast global recovery in 2021. Unlike that period, the years between 2001 and 2019 illustrated a different type of energy evolution for developed and developing countries regarding primary energy consumption. During this period the composition of energy balances of these two major groups demonstrated dramatic disparity, notably marked by the high share of coal in developing countries. The shock of 2020 led to a belief in expediting the transition to green energy, but in 2021 the economic recovery revived demand for oil and coal, dashing hopes for the growing renewable energy sources sector in the European Union that year. The return of coal, however, to the EU energy sector and stable demand for motor fuel globally led to the restoration of the GHG emission growth against the backdrop of the climate policy implementation failure. The current energy transition is denoted by features such as the flat oil demand in developed countries, the flat global demand for motor gasoline and the growing demand for diesel. The econometrics of demand for two motor oil products are quite opposite. For gasoline we have almost all hypotheses met: the negative influence of climate policy and oil prices, strong effect of dummies for shock of 2020 and 2021, and naturally 0.3 coefficient at GDP growth rate. Nevertheless, for diesel everything is exactly the opposite — only 0,4 coefficient at GDP and practically nothing else. This effect shows the strong role and trend for cargo use of diesel fueled trucks in the global economy. The high income of oil and gas majors in 2021 did not secure the investment upturn. A mature oil industry receives substantial profits for its investors, supplying dividends, and buying back debts without enlarging production capacities. At this point climate policy expectations of phasing out fossil fuels in the foreseeable future operated as a braking mechanism against reinvesting oil incomes. Moreover, at this junction we can observe governments’ limited capacity to pursue policies toward multiple objectives simultaneously: modest energy prices, energy transition and securing the sufficient capital formation for energy. The continued fusion of the economic upturn and energy transition will be dependent on demand and supply matching in the oil markets. It is also possible that the sanctions policies of 2022 may aggravate the situation, triggering high prices and uncertainties.</p>
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		    <category>Research Article</category>
		    <pubDate>Thu, 6 Oct 2022 20:56:11 +0000</pubDate>
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		    <title>Participatory farmer research and exploring the phytobiome: Next steps for agricultural productivity growth</title>
		    <link>https://rujec.org/article/80597/</link>
		    <description><![CDATA[
					<p>Russian Journal of Economics 8(1): 16-28</p>
					<p>DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.8.80597</p>
					<p>Authors: Margaret M. Zeigler, Ann Steensland</p>
					<p>Abstract: Agriculture and food systems must provide nutrition and agricultural products for nearly 10 billion people by 2050. Agriculture is a powerful economic driver, and by prioritizing agricultural productivity and innovation, food systems can become more resilient and improve the wider economy while generating employment. Yet, powerful solutions and approaches are needed that must move beyond “low-hanging fruit” when investing in low-income country agriculture systems. As part of the solution, we discuss innovations such as participatory research models from the International Potato Center (CIP) as well as how to unlock and harness existing plant genetics through the phytobiome.</p>
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		    <category>Research Article</category>
		    <pubDate>Fri, 25 Mar 2022 20:00:03 +0000</pubDate>
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		    <title>Where you export matters</title>
		    <link>https://rujec.org/article/75423/</link>
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					<p>Russian Journal of Economics 7(4): 313-325</p>
					<p>DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.7.75423</p>
					<p>Authors: Ivan L. Lyubimov</p>
					<p>Abstract: Economic complexity theory deepens our understanding of export diversification. However, it relies on aggregated data which might disguise important details. In particular, these data do not take information on importers into account even though this information can provide new insights about the pace of economic complexity evolution in a particular economy. The paper introduces these new insights by incorporating more detailed export data into analysis. I find that wealthier economies not only tend to export more sophisticated products, but also sell them to richer destinations. I discuss the case of Russia which seeks to become a more complex economy and gain technological ­sovereignty by implementing reindustrialization policy. However, Russian complex products rarely conquer richer markets and are better known to Russia’s geographic neighbors. Our findings suggest that such a pattern of reindustrialization might not be promising as long as a higher level of wealth is a concern. The paper claims that even though redesigning industrial policy such that it becomes more conditioned on export outcomes is not a solution to the problem, it is, however, one of its important ingredients.</p>
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		    <category>Research Article</category>
		    <pubDate>Thu, 30 Dec 2021 15:52:56 +0000</pubDate>
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		    <title>Analysis of the role of collectivism in light of the recent literature on the big triangle: Institutions, culture, and economic development</title>
		    <link>https://rujec.org/article/57894/</link>
		    <description><![CDATA[
					<p>Russian Journal of Economics 7(3): 185-199</p>
					<p>DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.7.57894</p>
					<p>Authors: Necati Berk</p>
					<p>Abstract: Why do similar economic and political institutions function differently in various cultures? Do cultural traits, differences in individualism versus collectivism, have a causal impact on economic behavior and development? This article presents a recent survey of the literature on the relationship between culture, institutions, and economic growth. On the one hand, part of the literature indicates that there is a one-way causality from culture to institutions and economic performance. On the other hand, there is an extensive literature that has established causality from institutions to economic growth and culture. However, a growing body of empirical research demonstrates that culture and institutions interact in two ways and complement each other affecting long-term growth. Research documents cultural variables affecting a great deal of economic activity and institutions across the world. Recent dominant discourse on the role of the individualism-collectivism cleavage in the determination of the wealth of nations has attempted to examine the positive effects of individualism rather than collectivism. This paper shows that the advantages of collectivism have been rarely researched within economic literature. Taking into account collectivism can shed light on various puzzles in economics, such as solving collective action problems.</p>
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		    <category>Research Article</category>
		    <pubDate>Fri, 3 Dec 2021 18:00:01 +0000</pubDate>
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		    <title>Global energy trilemma</title>
		    <link>https://rujec.org/article/58683/</link>
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					<p>Russian Journal of Economics 6(4): 437-462</p>
					<p>DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.6.58683</p>
					<p>Authors: Leonid M. Grigoryev, Dzhanneta D. Medzhidova</p>
					<p>Abstract: The international community has become increasingly concerned with sustainable development and particularly with preventing climate change. The COVID-19 pandemic and global recession of 2020 will exacerbate the situation not just for 2020–2021, but for many years to come. Sadly, it is a game-changer. The necessity to solve problems of poverty (energy poverty) and inequality, as well as growth and climate change mitigation, now haunts intellectuals, forecasters, and politicians. These three problems constitute the global energy trilemma (GET). There is a wide range of forecasts, scenarios, and political plans emerging after the Paris Agreement in 2015. They demonstrate concerns about the slow progress on the matter; however, they still increase the goals for 2030–2050. The global capital formation is a key tool for changes while also representing the hard-budget investment constraints. This article examines practical features of recent trends in energy, poverty, and climate change mitigation, arguing that allocation and coordinated management of sufficient financial resources are vital for a simultaneous solution of GET. No group of countries can hope to solve each of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) separately. The global economy has reached the point where it has an urgent need for cooperation.</p>
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		    <category>Research Article</category>
		    <pubDate>Mon, 14 Dec 2020 17:39:20 +0000</pubDate>
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		    <title>Russia’s diversification prospects</title>
		    <link>https://rujec.org/article/34753/</link>
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					<p>Russian Journal of Economics 5(2): 177-198</p>
					<p>DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.5.34753</p>
					<p>Authors: Ivan Lyubimov</p>
					<p>Abstract: The Russian economy heavily relies on exports of its natural resources. However, the resource-based status quo does not seem to be the route towards Russia’s long-run prosperity. To improve its position in the global income ranking, Russia needs to diversify its exports and make them more complex. Using highly detailed data on trade flows and applying network theory apparatus, we evaluate the level of export complexity in Russia from 1995 to 2016 and compare it with that of its BRICS fellow members. We find that Russia is stagnant with respects to its relative level of export complexity. This sluggishness embraced the entire period between 1995 and 2016, much longer than the stage of anemic growth that started there a decade ago. We also conclude that the current stock of know-how in Russia is relatively low and fragmented, thus not letting Russia diversify into a broad range of more complex products. Russia might also need to export a wider variety of products to richer economies. Today, on a par with Brazil and South Africa, it supplies a broader range of goods to its slowly growing next-door neighbors.</p>
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		    <category>Research Note</category>
		    <pubDate>Wed, 31 Jul 2019 09:02:18 +0000</pubDate>
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		    <title>Structural changes and economic growth in the world economy and Russia</title>
		    <link>https://rujec.org/article/35233/</link>
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					<p>Russian Journal of Economics 5(1): 1-26</p>
					<p>DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.5.35233</p>
					<p>Authors: Valeriy V. Mironov, Liudmila D. Konovalova</p>
					<p>Abstract: The article considers the problem of the relationship of structural changes and economic growth in the global economy and Russia in the framework of different methodological approaches. At the same time, the paper provides the analysis of complementarity of economic policy types, which, on the one hand, are aimed at developing the fundamentals of GDP growth (institutions, human capital and macroeconomic stabilization), and on the other hand, at initiating growth (with stable fundamentals) with the help of structural policy measures. In the study of structural changes in the global economy, new forms of policies of this kind have been revealed, in particular aimed at identifying sectors — drivers of economic growth based on a portfolio approach. In a given paper a preliminary version of the model of the Russian economy is provided, using a multisector version of the Thirlwall’s Law. Besides, the authors highlight a number of target parameters of indicators of competitiveness of the sectors of the Russian economy that allow us to expect its growth rate to accelerate above the exogenously given growth rate of the world economy.</p>
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		    <category>Research Article</category>
		    <pubDate>Wed, 17 Apr 2019 08:36:11 +0000</pubDate>
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		    <title>Decomposition of growth rates for the Russian economy</title>
		    <link>https://rujec.org/article/33617/</link>
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					<p>Russian Journal of Economics 4(4): 305-327</p>
					<p>DOI: 10.3897/j.ruje.4.33617</p>
					<p>Authors: Sergey Drobyshevsky, Georgy Idrisov, Andrey Kaukin, Pavel Pavlov, Sergey Sinelnikov-Murylev</p>
					<p>Abstract: In this paper, we present a methodology of GDP growth rate decomposition adapted for the Russian economy. We calculated the indicators for structural unemployment (NAWRU) and total factor productivity in Russia. We estimated the structural, foreign trade and cyclical components of GDP growth rates under various macroeconomic scenarios for the period from 2018 through 2024. The study shows that a significant contribution to growth rates for the period 2018 through 2024 will be made by the sum of the business cycle and random shock component, which, combined with the revitalization of investments in 2017, may indicate the beginning of a new cycle of economic growth in Russia. In the scenarios reviewed, the contribution from the foreign trade component will be negative from 2018 to 2024. The calculations indicate further stagnation of structural growth rates in the Russian economy from 2018 to 2024 at the level of approximately 1.5 p.p. in all of the basic macroeconomic scenarios reviewed. This points to the inexpediency in postponing structural reforms to create conditions for Russia’s economy to achieve growth rates that exceed world averages.</p>
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		    <category>Research Article</category>
		    <pubDate>Mon, 31 Dec 2018 11:12:02 +0000</pubDate>
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		    <title>Old wine and new bottles: A critical appraisal of the middle-income trap in BRICS countries</title>
		    <link>https://rujec.org/article/27726/</link>
		    <description><![CDATA[
					<p>Russian Journal of Economics 4(2): 133-154</p>
					<p>DOI: 10.3897/j.ruje.4.27726</p>
					<p>Authors: Christopher A. Hartwell</p>
					<p>Abstract: The idea of a middle-income trap is now over a decade old and continues to be applied to growth paths which have not been self-sustaining. With the bulk of emerging markets now approaching middle-income status, and given the reality of slower growth for many countries (and the policy recommendations that currently exist for overcoming this problem), is the middle-income trap still a relevant framework? Using reference to the BRICS countries, the key finding of this analysis is that the middle-income trap conceptualization is of little value-added, as fundamentals still matter, especially in relation to macroeconomic stability. Similarly, we note that “quality” institutions are necessary, both political and economic, including (smaller) size of government and property rights. The “trap” as currently formulated is thus nothing new or particularly relevant, as it repackages some familiar structural issues while avoiding other crucial ones.</p>
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		    <category>Research Article</category>
		    <pubDate>Sat, 30 Jun 2018 10:56:48 +0000</pubDate>
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		    <title>Sources of long run economic growth in Russia before and after the global financial crisis</title>
		    <link>https://rujec.org/article/27998/</link>
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					<p>Russian Journal of Economics 3(4): 348-365</p>
					<p>DOI: 10.1016/j.ruje.2017.12.003</p>
					<p>Authors: Ilya B. Voskoboynikov</p>
					<p>Abstract: Although productivity decline in the global economy was observed before 2008, the global financial crisis of 2008 stimulated study of its source. In this context, recent literature mentions inefficient investments in machinery, human capital, and organizational processes. This can include skill mismatch and the lack of technology diffusion from advanced to emerging industries and firms. To what extent is this global view helpful in understanding recent productivity decline in the Russian economy? The present study reports that at least some of these sources can be observed in Russia as well. Using conventional industry growth accounting, it compares pre- and post-crisis sources of growth for the Russian economy. Specifically, it presents aggregate labor productivity growth as the sum of capital intensity and total factor productivity (TFP) growth in industries, and the contribution of labor reallocation between industries. It shows that the stagnation of 2008–2014 is more the result of the TFP decline and the deterioration of the allocation of labor than the lack of capital input. Moreover, the TFP decline started in Russia a few years before the crisis, as it did in major global economies, such as the United States, OECD countries, China, and Brazil. At the same time, relatively stable capital intensity made the Russian pattern to some degree similar to resource abundant Australia and Canada. Furthermore, the contribution of information and communications technology capital to labor productivity growth in Russia declined after 2008, which could have also hampered technology diffusion. Finally, the structure of the flow of capital services in Russia changed after 2008. Before the crisis, the contribution of machinery and equipment dominated, while after the crisis, construction provided the lion's share of capital input.</p>
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			]]></description>
		    <category>Research Article</category>
		    <pubDate>Thu, 30 Nov 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		    <title>Income inequality revisited 60 years later: Piketty vs Kuznets</title>
		    <link>https://rujec.org/article/27981/</link>
		    <description><![CDATA[
					<p>Russian Journal of Economics 3(1): 42-53</p>
					<p>DOI: 10.1016/j.ruje.2017.02.003</p>
					<p>Authors: Ivan Lyubimov</p>
					<p>Abstract: This paper compares two popular views on the evolution of income inequality. The article by Simon Kuznets, which was published in American Economic Review in 1955, considers inequality as a byproduct of economic growth and suggests that a relatively rich economy should also be less unequal. In contrast, Thomas Piketty indicates that inequality is progressing, and an internationally coordinated policy is required to bring inequality under control. My paper applies the arguments of Kuznets and Piketty to the problem of income inequality in modern Russia.</p>
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		    <category>Research Article</category>
		    <pubDate>Tue, 28 Feb 2017 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		    <title>Terms of trade and Russian economic development</title>
		    <link>https://rujec.org/article/27972/</link>
		    <description><![CDATA[
					<p>Russian Journal of Economics 2(3): 279-301</p>
					<p>DOI: 10.1016/j.ruje.2016.09.002</p>
					<p>Authors: Georgy Idrisov, Yury Ponomarev, Sergey Sinelnikov-Murylev</p>
					<p>Abstract: The paper discusses economic development trends in Russia in late 2014 and 2015 and reviews the basic mechanisms of how changes in the terms of trade affect the economic development of countries from a historical perspective and with a particular focus on those changes in the Russian economy that occurred in late 2014 and 2015. The authors demonstrate that structural reforms aimed at diversification of production and exports are necessary for sustainable economic development, for social stability and for reducing the impact of variability in the terms of trade on the Russian economy. During periods of instability in the government agenda's measures for the real and financial sectors, it is necessary not only to compensate economic agents losses caused by changes in the terms of trade but also to improve the economic structure and to develop and enhance the stability of the financial markets.</p>
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			]]></description>
		    <category>Research Article</category>
		    <pubDate>Wed, 31 Aug 2016 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		    <title>Fiscal decentralization and regional economic growth: Theory, empirics, and the Russian experience</title>
		    <link>https://rujec.org/article/27958/</link>
		    <description><![CDATA[
					<p>Russian Journal of Economics 1(4): 404-418</p>
					<p>DOI: 10.1016/j.ruje.2016.02.004</p>
					<p>Authors: Andrey Yushkov</p>
					<p>Abstract: The article addresses the theoretical and empirical relation between fiscal decentralization and economic growth. An empirical analysis of Russian regions for 2005–2012 shows that excessive expenditure decentralization within the region, which is not accompanied by the respective level of revenue decentralization, is significantly and negatively related to regional economic growth. In contrast, regional dependence on intergovernmental fiscal transfers from the federal center is positively associated with economic growth.</p>
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		    <category>Research Article</category>
		    <pubDate>Mon, 30 Nov 2015 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		    <title>The myth of the “Culture code” in economic research</title>
		    <link>https://rujec.org/article/27953/</link>
		    <description><![CDATA[
					<p>Russian Journal of Economics 1(3): 294-312</p>
					<p>DOI: 10.1016/j.ruje.2015.12.006</p>
					<p>Authors: Vitaly Tambovtsev</p>
					<p>Abstract: This paper is devoted to the critical analysis of today's mainstream approach to the inclusion of the factor of culture in economic research. National culture is treated in this framework as a reified entity measured by societal values and is persistently included as a “culture code” throughout different contexts. The paper presents evidence contradicting this treatment, and an alternative methodology for economic analysis of cultural phenomena is suggested, namely that each mass cultural practice should be analyzed on a “case-by-case” basis, comparing stakeholders’ costs and benefits.</p>
					<p><a href="https://rujec.org/article/27953/">HTML</a></p>
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			]]></description>
		    <category>Research Article</category>
		    <pubDate>Mon, 31 Aug 2015 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		    <title>A theoretical interpretation of the oil prices impact on economic growth in contemporary Russia</title>
		    <link>https://rujec.org/article/27951/</link>
		    <description><![CDATA[
					<p>Russian Journal of Economics 1(3): 257-272</p>
					<p>DOI: 10.1016/j.ruje.2015.12.004</p>
					<p>Authors: Georgy Idrisov, Maria Kazakova, Andrey Polbin</p>
					<p>Abstract: This article analyzes the impact of global oil prices on Russia's economic growth and its growth rate in terms of output. It also reviews the mechanics of the long-term and short-term impacts on output resulting from changes in oil prices. The authors argue that the effect of oil prices on output has decreased dramatically under current economic conditions ever since the period of recovery growth in the early 2000s. The main conclusion of the paper is that, on the basis of classical models, a constant increase in oil prices cannot influence the long-term economic growth rate and only predetermines short-term transitional trends from one long-term equilibrium to another.</p>
					<p><a href="https://rujec.org/article/27951/">HTML</a></p>
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			]]></description>
		    <category>Research Article</category>
		    <pubDate>Mon, 31 Aug 2015 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		    <title>A new growth model for the Russian economy</title>
		    <link>https://rujec.org/article/27940/</link>
		    <description><![CDATA[
					<p>Russian Journal of Economics 1(1): 30-54</p>
					<p>DOI: 10.1016/j.ruje.2015.05.002</p>
					<p>Authors: Alexey Kudrin, Evsey Gurvich</p>
					<p>Abstract: The problems underlying the current slowdown of the Russian economy are of a persistent nature and cannot be resolved with simple measures such as a softer monetary or fiscal policy. The fundamental reason for these problems is the weak market environment dominated by public and quasi-public companies. A new growth model should be based upon strong incentive for the business, as well as the government regulation system, to improve efficiency. This article defines the main steps to be taken in building such a model.</p>
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			]]></description>
		    <category>Research Article</category>
		    <pubDate>Sat, 28 Feb 2015 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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