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        <title>Latest Articles from Russian Journal of Economics</title>
        <description>Latest 7 Articles from Russian Journal of Economics</description>
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            <title>Latest Articles from Russian Journal of Economics</title>
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		    <title>The impetus for economic reform and the creation of an international comparisons system in Comecon (1962–1969)</title>
		    <link>https://rujec.org/article/171619/</link>
		    <description><![CDATA[
					<p>Russian Journal of Economics 12(1): 121-136</p>
					<p>DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.12.171619</p>
					<p>Authors: Aleksei A. Popov</p>
					<p>Abstract: This paper examines the impact of economic reforms in the USSR and the Comecon countries, in particular the Kosygin reform (1965), on the development of a system of international economic comparisons in 1962–1969. Using previously unpublished archival materials from Comecon and Soviet statistical agencies, the author shows that reform initiatives stimulated methodological innovations, such as purchasing power parity (PPP) comparisons. However, institutional conflicts, ideological constraints, and technological limitations hindered the system’s integration into global practice, notably the UN International Comparison Program (ICP). The article argues that, despite partial successes, the stagnation of the project after 1969 reflected deeper systemic deficiencies within planned economies, including bureaucratic inertia and unresolved competition among research centers.</p>
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		    <category>Research Article</category>
		    <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 19:00:06 +0000</pubDate>
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		    <title>Three attempts at market reform of the Soviet economy: A comparative analysis</title>
		    <link>https://rujec.org/article/173518/</link>
		    <description><![CDATA[
					<p>Russian Journal of Economics 12(1): 60-94</p>
					<p>DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.12.173518</p>
					<p>Authors: Ivan M. Baydakov, Vladimir A. Mau</p>
					<p>Abstract: This article presents a comparative overview of the three main attempts to introduce market approaches into the economy of the Soviet Union during its seventy-year history: the New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1921–1928, the Kosygin reform of 1965, and perestroika from 1985 to 1991. The research aims to analyze and compare the nature, political conditions, institutional challenges, and ultimate consequences of these three initiatives, which sought to improve the Soviet system through incremental market integration without changing the core political power structure. Each of the three reform efforts initially triggered a period of accelerated growth, outperforming previous economic trends. However, these successes were short-lived, and all reforms were quickly rolled back. The study’s main finding indicates a fundamental structural incompatibility between market mechanisms and the Soviet political order. This contradiction, rooted in the communist idea, meant that when central control weakened, immediate interests (wages, consumption) outweighed long-term interests (investment). The reforms also differed significantly in their approach to private property: the NEP allowed it as a “temporary retreat,” the Kosygin reform strictly prohibited it, and perestroika gradually permitted private enterprise, eventually evolving into a “real revolution.” In the end, all three attempts failed to create a stable, durable system. The Soviet experience clearly demonstrates that, within its specific historical context, it was impossible to combine Soviet political power with market efficiency. The political core consistently rejected the necessary deep changes, leading to the strategic failure of all liberalization efforts.</p>
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		    <category>Research Article</category>
		    <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 19:00:04 +0000</pubDate>
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		    <title>Thirty years of economic transition in the former Soviet Union: Microeconomic and institutional dimensions</title>
		    <link>https://rujec.org/article/104761/</link>
		    <description><![CDATA[
					<p>Russian Journal of Economics 9(1): 1-32</p>
					<p>DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.9.104761</p>
					<p>Authors: Marek Dabrowski</p>
					<p>Abstract: The post-communist transition in the former Soviet Union (FSU) cannot be considered entirely successful, especially in the political and institutional spheres. Nevertheless, in the economic sphere, the transition process succeeded in rebuilding the foundations of market economies based on private ownership by the early 2000s, even if the adopted­ policies and institutions have proved suboptimal and distortive in many countries. The transition experience in the FSU region has demonstrated a correlation between political and economic reforms, with a strong impact of the former on the latter. The deficit of democracy, civil freedoms and the rule of law has negatively impacted the course of the economic transition, causing significant delay, distortions and partial reversals.</p>
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		    <category>Research Article</category>
		    <pubDate>Thu, 13 Apr 2023 18:59:46 +0000</pubDate>
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		    <title>Land prices and railroad building in European Russia, 1860s to the early 1900s</title>
		    <link>https://rujec.org/article/56600/</link>
		    <description><![CDATA[
					<p>Russian Journal of Economics 7(2): 93-104</p>
					<p>DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.7.56600</p>
					<p>Authors: Carol S. Leonard, Zafar Nazarov, Leonid I. Borodkin, Maria A. Karpenko, Roman B. Konchakov</p>
					<p>Abstract: This paper shows that railroad building in Russia, as in Europe and the US in the nineteenth century, improved the value of land, a classic benefit of transportation investment in largely agrarian countries. From a database constructed for this paper, we use cross-sectional data for the fifty European Russian regions to show the association of the length of the railroad (measured in 1894), land prices (measured in 1900) and annual growth of land prices (in rubles) for 1885–1910.</p>
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			]]></description>
		    <category>Research Article</category>
		    <pubDate>Fri, 9 Jul 2021 15:58:16 +0000</pubDate>
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		    <title>Twenty years of the G20: Has it changed global economic governance?</title>
		    <link>https://rujec.org/article/49435/</link>
		    <description><![CDATA[
					<p>Russian Journal of Economics 5(4): 412-440</p>
					<p>DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.5.49435</p>
					<p>Authors: Suman Bery, Filippo Biondi, Sybrand Brekelmans</p>
					<p>Abstract: The G20 has become the preeminent forum for international economic coordination. Twenty years after its creation, the paper reviews its performance with respect to the coordination of macroeconomic policies. The retrospective assessment focuses on two main questions: (i) Have the G20 summits succeeded in promoting macroeconomic policies with positive cross-border consequences, while preventing the opposite? (ii) To what extent has expanding the G7 to a diverse group of emerging and developing economies significantly changed the discourse and affected substantive outcomes? We argue that the G20 played a key role during the crisis of 2008, but policy coordination has been problematic since. Our review suggests that the G20 Presidencies of the emerging economies have made considerable efforts to shape the agenda toward issues of their interest, but have not always prevailed, notably on issues of global financial governance.</p>
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			]]></description>
		    <category>Research Article</category>
		    <pubDate>Fri, 20 Dec 2019 11:00:06 +0000</pubDate>
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		    <title>From Karl Menger to Charles Menger? How Austrian economics (hardly) spread in France</title>
		    <link>https://rujec.org/article/26001/</link>
		    <description><![CDATA[
					<p>Russian Journal of Economics 4(1): 8-30</p>
					<p>DOI: 10.3897/j.ruje.4.26001</p>
					<p>Authors: Gilles Campagnolo</p>
					<p>Abstract: The father of the “Austrian” Marginalist revolution and founder of the so-called “Austrian School of economics”, Carl Menger, had a mixed reception during different periods of development of French economics. Somewhat welcomed in the early days, he was rather forgotten later on. Even his major works were not published in translation until recently. What is the reason for such a situation? Criticisms of classical political economy have to be understood in their French context. In comparison to other countries, this paper details the case of France, besides showing how later Austrians, such as Friedrich Hayek, found a limited audience. This comparative study of economic ideas in France must start with the reception of the views of the founder and the role and impact of adopting/adapting or rejecting his views by French scholars. What place did they find in French academia? From Carl Menger to a “Frenchified” Charles Menger, how was Austrian economic thought disseminated in France? This essay starts by recalling the Belle-Époque and an astonishing letter by Charles Rist for the Jubiläum of Menger, in which he deplored the lack of translation of the latter’s works. The Austrian School in France is then discussed as pure economics replaces political economy in the Interwar period, with the 1938 Paris Congress of “liberal thinkers,” as the Vienna Circle became known, also comparing issues in philosophy. The paper considers how Austrian theories of “pure science” were received in Paris from the Vienna of the 1900s, at a time of ”Crossroads,” to the present day, through the Postwar and Cold War, until a revival since the 1990s and a rethinking of economic ideas after 2008.</p>
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			]]></description>
		    <category>Research Article</category>
		    <pubDate>Fri, 20 Apr 2018 17:20:58 +0000</pubDate>
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		    <title>Economic Fluctuations in Russia (from the late 1920s to 2015)</title>
		    <link>https://rujec.org/article/27945/</link>
		    <description><![CDATA[
					<p>Russian Journal of Economics 1(2): 130-153</p>
					<p>DOI: 10.1016/j.ruje.2015.11.002</p>
					<p>Authors: Sergey Smirnov</p>
					<p>Abstract: In many respects, the historical trajectory of the Russian economy during the XX century has been a terra incognita until now. As for official statistics, at least three important reasons can be given for this. First, many relevant indicators were either not measured or were kept secret and never published. Second, Russia (as the RSFSR) was a part of the USSR, and statistics for the RSFSR were much less prevalent than for the USSR as a whole (historical changes in Russia's borders also require special consideration). Third, an ideological dogma implied the absence of inflation in the planned Soviet economy; therefore, all deflators (if any) were underestimated, and all aggregates in constant and/or comparable prices were overestimated (as were the corresponding growth rates). As for the unofficial historical estimates, most of them were focused on the USSR, not on the RSFSR; therefore, there is a considerable risk in using them as a proxy for historical indicators of the Russian Federation. Hence, our first aim was to construct statistical time series that might be useful in describing the long-term trajectory of the Russian (the RSFSR and/or the RF) economy. Using previously unpublished data stored in Russian archives, we attempted to extend them as far back as possible; in fact, most of the series began in the late 1920s. Our second aim was to denote periods of growth and contraction in the Russian economy and to reveal the economic factors that caused changes in trajectory. Periods of contraction during the era of the planned economy were of special interest for us. We found that recessions had occurred, not only in the market but also in the planned Russian economy (of course, with a significant remark that contractions in the planned economy were much rarer but evidently more destructive).</p>
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			]]></description>
		    <category>Research Article</category>
		    <pubDate>Sun, 31 May 2015 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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