DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.10.126926

Authors: Faroque Ahmed

Abstract: Being geopolitically exposed, the Russian financial sector is vulnerable to various uncertainties. The aim of the article is to examine the quantile movements and dynamic connectedness of uncertainty indices with the financial stress index of Russia employing the cross-quantilogram (CQ), recursive cross-quantilogram (R-CQ) and TVP‑VAR dynamic connectedness using monthly data from July 2011 to August 2023. It is found that for Tweeter-based Economic Uncertainty (TEU) and Global Economic Policy Uncertainty (GEPU), there is strong positive dependence on the Russian Financial Stress Index (RFSI) in the bearish states of market in the initial memory, and the strength of this positive spillover effect gradually wilts towards longer memory structures. Unlike the GEPU, Russian Economic Policy Uncertainty (REPU) has long-lasting heterogeneous spillover effects on RFSI. Though there are significant positive, as well as negative, spillover effects of Global Geopolitical Risk (GGPR) on RFSI in the initial memory, across the longer memory structures these entire heterogeneous effects wash out. However, Russian Geopolitical Risk (RGPR) have long-lasting heterogeneous spillover effects on RFSI, unlike GGPR. GEPU, GGPR and RGPR were the net transmitters while RFSI, TEU and REPU were net receivers of volatility shocks. Since RFSI shows resilience over the long-term horizon to global geopolitics and economic uncertainty, investors are advised to keep patience and hold their capital/investment up to a minimum of 1 year in Russian financial system in order to be rewarded with positive returns.

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DOI: 10.1016/j.ruje.2016.02.002

Authors: Evsey Gurvich, Ilya Prilepskiy

Abstract: This paper examines the impact of the current Western financial sanctions on the Russian economy. Modeling the capital flow components (accounting for the influence of other factors, including falling oil prices) reveals that sanctions have directly affected sanctioned state-controlled banks, oil, gas and arms companies by severely constraining foreign funding and have indirectly affected non-sanctioned companies by reducing inflows of foreign direct investment and causing funding conditions to deteriorate. The overall negative effect on gross capital inflow over 2014–2017 is estimated at approximately $280bn. However, the effect on net capital inflow is significantly lower ($160–170bn) due to Russian companies’ self-adjustment, which is evidenced by their utilization of foreign assets accumulated earlier for debt repayment and an overall decrease in gross capital outflow. The sanctions’ estimated effect on GDP is significant (–2.4 p.p. by 2017, compared with a hypothetical scenario with no sanctions) but 3.3 times lower than the estimated effects of the oil price shock.

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