DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.12.158069

Authors: Karen A. Tumanyants, Fyodor B. Kuleshov, Henry I. Penikas, Vasily E. Zuev

Abstract: Many studies have found that inflation expectations vary systematically across population groups. This heterogeneity is driven among other factors by the level of financial literacy — a pattern documented for Russia as well. Earlier Russian evidence, however, rested on a single survey wave; we confirm the finding using data spanning three years: respondents with higher financial literacy tend to have lower inflation expectations. For this study, we rely on the pseudo-panel method to combine the results of two regular household surveys focused on inflation expectations and consumer finance. Our findings are based on responses to both quantitative and qualitative questions, controlling for key socio-demographic characteristics. We show that inflation expectations are linked to the level of financial literacy, but this relationship is nonlinear. Our conclusion holds for short- (one month ahead), medium- (one year ahead) and long-term (three years ahead) expectations. The nonlinearity of the relationship is evident: despite similar differences in the level of financial literacy, the gap in inflation expectations is larger in the least competent group of respondents in comparison with financially literate participants. We find that estimates of future inflation are linked to financial literacy through the perception of observed inflation, as more financially literate respondents cite lower rates of price growth, and their opinions about future inflation are tied to their estimates of observed price movements. Financially literate respondents’ estimates of current inflation are closer to the Rosstat-calculated measure of price growth than are the estimates of other respondents.

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DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.12.165831

Authors: Arthur R. Mustafin

Abstract: This article examines archival records on crop yields and recruit numbers in eighteenth-century Russia, analyzing their dynamics and comparing them with data on recruits’ height as an indicator of changes in the standard of living. The study uses more than one hundred and ten archival sources, enabling the construction of time series. The resulting numbers confirm that the standard of living in Russia was generally low and changed in a cyclical pattern. The study reveals how military and tax reforms emerged as a significant driver of these economic fluctuations. The dataset compiled by the author not only facilitates estimations of living standards during this period but also enables researchers to address various questions in Russian social and economic history.

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DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.11.154180

Authors: Wasim Ullah

Abstract: Financial development plays a crucial role in shaping economic growth, yet it can introduce volatility. This study examines the relationship between financial development and economic growth volatility. Using panel data from 60 countries (30 developed and 30 developing) for 1981–2022, we employ panel-corrected standard errors and generalized method of moments to ensure robustness. Financial development is analyzed through financial institutions and financial markets across three dimensions: depth, access, and efficiency. Conceptually, the paper finds that the supply-leading hypothesis does not account for the economic growth volatility associated with excessive financialization. The results indicate that, at higher levels, financial development has a volatility-enhancing impact in developed countries, while in developing countries it has a volatility-reducing effect. Policymakers in developed countries should ensure that credit expansion is aligned with real-sector development. Regulators should monitor adverse effects of financial depth and ensure funds are directed toward real-sector growth, while improving access and efficiency. In a too‑much-finance scenario, economies need moderators — such as strong regulatory quality and well-defined rights for creditors and borrowers — to mitigate volatility-enhancing effects.

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DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.11.126000

Authors: Nwabisa Florence Ndzama

Abstract: We find that, while different models used to estimate the output gap in five major emerging economies show similar trends over time, they lead to different conclusions about how well the output gap can predict inflation. This suggests that the choice of model can significantly impact the conclusions drawn about the relationship between the output gap and inflation. The multivariate Hodrick–Prescott filter and the structural vector autoregressive model produce the smallest forecast errors in most cases among the four output gap models considered. We further find some indications of a better inflation forecasting ability of the output gap in countries with inflation targeting, suggesting that the improved transparency related to inflation targeting might support the inflation forecasting process.

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DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.10.113578

Authors: Inna S. Lola, Dmitry G. Asoskov

Abstract: This study investigates the utility of business uncertainty indicators as predictive tools for forecasting economic activity in the context of Russia. In an era characterized by global economic volatility and geopolitical shifts, understanding the dynamics of economic uncertainty and its impact on overall economic performance is of paramount importance. The study utilizes a comprehensive dataset based on the results of business tendency surveys in Russia, spanning the period from 2009 to the first half of 2024. Given the importance of uncertainty in shaping economic outcomes, the central research question of this study is: can uncertainty indicators predict business activity in Russia or not? To address this question, we compared two alternative approaches to calculating business uncertainty: the ex‑ante approach, which uses the business community’s assessments of future business trends to measure uncertainty as the dispersion of opinions expressed, and the ex‑post approach, which applies entrepreneurial assessments of both future and current trends to determine business uncertainty as the degree of deviation of entrepreneurial expectations from the real picture. National indicators and sectoral indicators were calculated for the mining and quarrying industry, manufacturing industry, construction, retail trade, wholesale trade and services. For most of the industries under consideration (except for the construction and service sector) and at the national level, the specifications of vector autoregression models that were effective for forecasting real indicators of economic activity, characterized by lower forecast errors compared to standard autoregressive models, were built. According to the results obtained, at the national level, when forecasting GDP, clear preference should be given to the ex‑post indicator.

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DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.9.113503

Authors: Rostislav I. Kapeliushnikov

Abstract: This paper provides a statistical portrait of the Russian labor market during the latest period of 2010–2022. The analysis delves into both the long-term trends in its evolution and short-term fluctuations associated with its adjustment to economic downturns. The most noteworthy among the long-term changes are a gradual shrinkage of the labor force and employment, the transition to record low unemployment, a sharp acceleration in worker turnover, and the emergence of an extensive overhang of unfilled job vacancies. During the period under review, the Russian economy experienced three strong adverse macroeconomic shocks — the first sanctions crisis in 2014–2015, the corona crisis in 2000–2021, and the second sanctions crisis, which began in 2022 and is still far from over. The paper provides the evidence that the Russian labor market has retained the same algorithm for accommodation to economic downturns, which it developed back in the 1990s. A distinctive feature of this specific model is that the negative shocks are absorbed predominantly through declines in wages and reductions in working hours, rather than through contraction of employment and surge in unemployment. The general conclusion is that the Russian labor market is undergoing a transition from a functional regime marked by tight labor demand to another characterized by tight labor supply.

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DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.9.111967

Authors: Eugene L. Goryunov, Sergey M. Drobyshevsky, Alexey L. Kudrin, Pavel V. Trunin

Abstract: The paper examines the factors of global inflation acceleration in 2021–2022. We consider primarily the developed economies, where rates of inflation over the last two years have exceeded multi-year highs and have significantly exceeded target levels. We find that the cause of accelerating inflation was an imbalance between aggregate demand, which started to increase rapidly in the second half of 2020 as economies began to adapt to the circumstances of the pandemic, and aggregate supply, which encountered persistent constraints associated with interruptions in global supply chains. Significant support for demand was provided by fiscal stimulus that was unprecedented in scale and was accompanied by policy interest rates reaching extremely low levels, and by active injections of liquidity by central banks. The willingness of governments to implement ultra-expansionary monetary and fiscal policies can to a considerable degree be attributed to the fact that during the previous decade large budget deficits, zero interest rates, and programs of quantitative easing had not resulted in macroeconomic destabilization. We examine the view of many central banks that the inflationary wave would not be long-lasting, which was a crucial reason for delaying the interest rates increase. We consider the conditions in which the leading economies might fall into the stagflation trap.

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DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.8.90947

Authors: Marek Dabrowski

Abstract: The paper contains a retrospective analysis of macroeconomic policy and reforms in the countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU) from 1992 to 2021, after obtaining political and economic independence in 1991. Special attention is given to problems of macroeconomic stabilization and economic growth. As a result of structural distortions inherited from the Soviet economy and the slow pace of economic and institutional reforms, the FSU countries suffered from a long and deep output decline in the 1990s. Their post-transition growth recovery in the 2000s did not last long. Furthermore, they remain vulnerable to both domestic and external economic shocks. Given the limited predictability of post-COVID global economic trends and the damaging consequences of the war in Ukraine, this vulnerability will likely continue in the next couple of years.

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DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.7.78432

Authors: Leonid M. Grigoryev, Marina F. Starodubtseva

Abstract: Brazilian economic reforms in 21st century have great importance for the international community, especially for other countries of the middle level of development. The authors­ believe that, in spite of all the difficulties and crises, Brazil has made a decisive step forward by reforming its social structure and retaining democracy. Social reforms (especially­ minimal wage) led to strengthening middle class, but also to elevating its social aspirations. At this dramatic junction the economic development of the country was aggravated by external shocks and unsuccessful budget policies. The complex interaction of social macro­economic policies in Brazil with strong external shocks gives lessons to countries with similar characteristics. The pandemic and recession of 2020–2021 have made the path of development more complicated but there is room for optimism for Brazil in the long run.

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DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.5.49345

Authors: Arne Melchior

Abstract: The article examines Russia’s participation in world trade and trade policy, using trade data for 1996–2017 and simulations of a numerical world trade model where Russia is divided into domestic regions. Since the mid-1990s, Russia’s foreign trade has grown much faster than the world average. This was accompanied by rapid deterioration in the trade balance for manufacturing, and fast redirection of imports, with more from China and relatively less from others, especially Eastern Europe. Only 1/8 of Russia’s foreign trade in 2017 was with Eastern Europe. This is why Russia can gain more from trade integration with the world beyond Eastern Europe, according to the model simulation analysis. For Russian domestic regions, multilateral liberalization among all countries has a similar effect across all of them, with a welfare gain due to lower import prices. For the commodity-exporting regions of Russia, preferential free trade agreements (FTAs) have a similar impact. For the more industrialized Russian regions, on the other hand, FTAs lead to manufacturing growth, rising wages and higher prices, and a larger welfare gain. According to the model simulations, trade integration promotes industrial diversification, with manufacturing growth also in some commodity regions. The results indicate that external liberalization is particularly important for the central parts of Russia; with Volga and West Siberia generally obtaining the strongest manufacturing boost from trade integration.

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DOI: 10.32609/j.ruje.5.47349

Authors: Philipp Kartaev, Ilya Medvedev

Abstract: The paper examines the impact of oil price shocks on inflation, as well as the impact of the choice of the monetary policy regime on the strength of this influence. We used dynamic models on panel data for the countries of the world for 2000–2017. It is shown that the impact of changes in oil prices on inflation is carried out predominantly through the channel of exchange rate. The paper demonstrates the influence of the transition to inflation targeting on the nature of the relationship between oil price shocks and inflation. This effect is asymmetrical: during periods of rising oil prices, inflation targeting reduces the effect of the oil prices pass-through, limiting the negative effects of shock. During periods of decline in oil prices, this monetary policy regime, in contrast, contributes to a stronger pass-through, helping to reduce inflation.

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DOI: 10.3897/j.ruje.4.33617

Authors: Sergey Drobyshevsky, Georgy Idrisov, Andrey Kaukin, Pavel Pavlov, Sergey Sinelnikov-Murylev

Abstract: In this paper, we present a methodology of GDP growth rate decomposition adapted for the Russian economy. We calculated the indicators for structural unemployment (NAWRU) and total factor productivity in Russia. We estimated the structural, foreign trade and cyclical components of GDP growth rates under various macroeconomic scenarios for the period from 2018 through 2024. The study shows that a significant contribution to growth rates for the period 2018 through 2024 will be made by the sum of the business cycle and random shock component, which, combined with the revitalization of investments in 2017, may indicate the beginning of a new cycle of economic growth in Russia. In the scenarios reviewed, the contribution from the foreign trade component will be negative from 2018 to 2024. The calculations indicate further stagnation of structural growth rates in the Russian economy from 2018 to 2024 at the level of approximately 1.5 p.p. in all of the basic macroeconomic scenarios reviewed. This points to the inexpediency in postponing structural reforms to create conditions for Russia’s economy to achieve growth rates that exceed world averages.

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DOI: 10.1016/j.ruje.2017.12.004

Authors: Iikka Korhonen, Riikka Nuutilainen

Abstract: This study estimates whether the monetary policy rules of Bank of Russia have changed recently. Russia has moved towards inflation targeting over the past years, which is reflected in our empirical estimations. We start by estimating various monetary policy rules for Russia, concluding that a variant of the Taylor rule depicts Bank of Russia's monetary policy over the past decade well. Moreover, there have been two clear breaks in the coefficients of the estimated monetary policy rule, possibly signifying a shift towards traditional inflation targeting and also the current recent economic turbulence.

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DOI: 10.1016/j.ruje.2017.09.004

Authors: Evgeny Vinokurov, Mikhail Demidenko, Dmitry Korshunov, Mihaly Kovacs

Abstract: After achieving substantial progress in establishing a common customs territory and regulations, customs unions face potential disruptions due to a lack of monetary policy coordination. These disruptions might appear in the form of currency shocks and the ensuing trade conflicts. We approach this issue by looking at the case of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The volatility of national currencies in 2014–2015 resulted in sizable shifts in competitiveness, culminating in a currency crisis in some member states. This raises the questions of how to gradually achieve a more coordinated monetary policy, what monetary policy options are available, and what would be their relative impact on macroeconomic stability. Using a set of modeling tools and econometric models, we review three monetary regimes, which represent moves from fully independent exchange rate policy through increased policy coordination to joint exchange rate setting.

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DOI: 10.1016/j.ruje.2016.04.002

Authors: Eugene Nivorozhkin, Giorgio Castagneto-Gissey

Abstract: This paper studies the dynamic relationship between returns in the Russian stock market and global equity markets in the aftermath of the 2014 Ukrainian crisis. We apply dynamic goodness-of-fit and bootstrapped regression approaches to study the behavior of global equity indices. Our results reveal a significant fall in the degree of synchronicity between the Russian and global equity returns after the crisis outbreak. The Russian stock market clearly decoupled from both developed and emerging markets, as shown by a 30–50% decline in returns correlation. In view of dramatic increase in synchronicity across the Russian sectoral stock indices after the sanctions were introduced, our results suggest that the economic sanctions imposed on Russia during that period have effectively isolated the Russian equity market from the rest of the world and triggered extensive portfolio outflows from the Russian market. As a result of the economic sanctions and the limited choice of investments in Russia, the decreased co-movement between the Russian and global equity returns is unlikely to provide investors with superior diversification opportunities, whilst the returns of the Russian market in the medium-term will likely continue to be predominately driven by idiosyncratic news.

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DOI: 10.1016/j.ruje.2016.02.005

Authors: Sergey Beshenov, Ivan Rozmainsky

Abstract: This article attempts to analyze the current debt crisis in Greece based on the financial instability hypothesis developed by Hyman Minsky. This article shows that the hypothesis provides an understanding of how an economy endogenously becomes “financially fragile” and thus prone to crises. The authors analyze how public and private sector behavior in the Greek economy led to the country's debt crisis. In particular, based on a sample of 36 Greek companies, the authors show that between 2001 and 2014, the majority of those companies had switched to fragile financial structures. Special attention is devoted to the negative consequences of applying the neoclassical doctrine of “austerity measures” in Greece as the principal “anti-crisis” concept of mainstream economic science.

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DOI: 10.1016/j.ruje.2016.02.001

Authors: Francesco Grigoli, Alexander Herman, Andrew Swiston, Gabriel Di Bella

Abstract: Output gap estimates are subject to a wide range of uncertainty owing principally to the difficulty in distinguishing between cycle and trend in real time. We show that country desks tend to overestimate economic slack, especially during recessions, and that uncertainty in initial output gap estimates persists several years. Only a small share of output gap revisions is predictable based on output dynamics, data quality, and policy frameworks. We also show that for a group of Latin American inflation targeters the prescriptions from monetary policy rules are subject to large changes due to revised output gap estimates. These explain a sizable proportion of the deviation of inflation from target, suggesting this information is not accounted for in real-time policy decisions.

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DOI: 10.1016/j.ruje.2015.12.004

Authors: Georgy Idrisov, Maria Kazakova, Andrey Polbin

Abstract: This article analyzes the impact of global oil prices on Russia's economic growth and its growth rate in terms of output. It also reviews the mechanics of the long-term and short-term impacts on output resulting from changes in oil prices. The authors argue that the effect of oil prices on output has decreased dramatically under current economic conditions ever since the period of recovery growth in the early 2000s. The main conclusion of the paper is that, on the basis of classical models, a constant increase in oil prices cannot influence the long-term economic growth rate and only predetermines short-term transitional trends from one long-term equilibrium to another.

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DOI: 10.1016/j.ruje.2015.12.005

Authors: Valeriy Mironov

Abstract: Falling oil prices are leading to a reduction in domestic demand and lowering of the ruble exchange rate, thus enhancing the price competitiveness of Russian producers and stimulating the supply side of the economy (especially in foreign markets unaffected by the recession). Indeed, all of this create the possibility of offsetting the decline in domestic demand to a varying degree through increased net exports. However, the present study shows that, taking into account all of the structural problems of the Russian economy, the devaluation of the ruble may lead to a more severe recession than anticipated by most experts in their estimates, judging by average consensus forecasts (as of the end of September 2015).

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DOI: 10.1016/j.ruje.2015.11.002

Authors: Sergey Smirnov

Abstract: In many respects, the historical trajectory of the Russian economy during the XX century has been a terra incognita until now. As for official statistics, at least three important reasons can be given for this. First, many relevant indicators were either not measured or were kept secret and never published. Second, Russia (as the RSFSR) was a part of the USSR, and statistics for the RSFSR were much less prevalent than for the USSR as a whole (historical changes in Russia's borders also require special consideration). Third, an ideological dogma implied the absence of inflation in the planned Soviet economy; therefore, all deflators (if any) were underestimated, and all aggregates in constant and/or comparable prices were overestimated (as were the corresponding growth rates). As for the unofficial historical estimates, most of them were focused on the USSR, not on the RSFSR; therefore, there is a considerable risk in using them as a proxy for historical indicators of the Russian Federation. Hence, our first aim was to construct statistical time series that might be useful in describing the long-term trajectory of the Russian (the RSFSR and/or the RF) economy. Using previously unpublished data stored in Russian archives, we attempted to extend them as far back as possible; in fact, most of the series began in the late 1920s. Our second aim was to denote periods of growth and contraction in the Russian economy and to reveal the economic factors that caused changes in trajectory. Periods of contraction during the era of the planned economy were of special interest for us. We found that recessions had occurred, not only in the market but also in the planned Russian economy (of course, with a significant remark that contractions in the planned economy were much rarer but evidently more destructive).

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