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Research Article
Assessment of the impact of financial literacy on inflation expectations based on pseudo‑panel data for Russia
expand article infoKaren A. Tumanyants, Fyodor B. Kuleshov§, Henry I. Penikas|, Vasily E. Zuev|
‡ Bank of Russia, Southern Main Branch, Krasnodar, Russia
§ Bank of Russia, Far Eastern Main Branch, Vladivostok, Russia
| Bank of Russia, Moscow, Russia
Open Access

Abstract

Many studies have found that inflation expectations vary systematically across population groups. This heterogeneity is driven among other factors by the level of financial literacy — a pattern documented for Russia as well. Earlier Russian evidence, however, rested on a single survey wave; we confirm the finding using data spanning three years: respondents with higher financial literacy tend to have lower inflation expectations. For this study, we rely on the pseudo-panel method to combine the results of two regular household surveys focused on inflation expectations and consumer finance. Our findings are based on responses to both quantitative and qualitative questions, controlling for key socio-demographic characteristics. We show that inflation expectations are linked to the level of financial literacy, but this relationship is nonlinear. Our conclusion holds for short- (one month ahead), medium- (one year ahead) and long-term (three years ahead) expectations. The nonlinearity of the relationship is evident: despite similar differences in the level of financial literacy, the gap in inflation expectations is larger in the least competent group of respondents in comparison with financially literate participants. We find that estimates of future inflation are linked to financial literacy through the perception of observed inflation, as more financially literate respondents cite lower rates of price growth, and their opinions about future inflation are tied to their estimates of observed price movements. Financially literate respondents’ estimates of current inflation are closer to the Rosstat-calculated measure of price growth than are the estimates of other respondents.

Keywords:

inflation expectations, financial literacy, instrumental variables, observed inflation.

JEL classification: C5, C8, D1, E31, G53.

1. Introduction

Household inflation expectations have drawn increasing attention in recent decades, especially in countries that have adopted inflation-targeting monetary policy regimes (ECB, 2021; Burr, 2025). The Bank of Russia’s publications also clearly show that the analysis of inflation expectations plays an important role in the conduct of monetary policy (see Bank of Russia, 2024b, Appendix 5).

The persistent differences in inflation expectations across population groups have drawn attention to the factors behind this heterogeneity. These factors include, in addition to socio-demographic characteristics, the level of financial literacy. The inverse correlation between Russian households’ inflation expectations and their financial literacy was first established in a study by Andreev et al. (2024), who confirm results obtained using foreign data.

Our study investigates whether the finding of lower inflation expectations among financially literate Russians holds for longer data horizons. To this end, we create a pseudo-panel by combining the results of surveys for 2018, 2020, and 2022 conducted by InFOM and Demoskop (jointly with the Bank of Russia). Our results confirm the nature of the correlation between inflation expectations and respondents’ financial literacy. The findings are robust to the choice of indicator of inflation expectations (short-/medium-/long-term, qualitative/quantitative, current/future price growth rates).

We establish that the differences in the estimates of future inflation stem from differences in the perception of current price movements. Highly literate respondents are more moderate in their judgments about observed price dynamics.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 describes the data and presents the research design. Section 4 describes the methodology. Section 5 contains the results of the calculations, and finally, Section 6 discusses the results and presents the key conclusions.

2. Literature review

2.1. Financial literacy: Measurement and determinants

The Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation defines financial literacy as “the basic knowledge, skills and abilities required to make financial decisions that ensure financial well-being and mitigate financial risks.”1 According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), financial literacy is a set of awareness, knowledge, skills, attitudes and behaviours that enable individuals to make informed and smart financial decisions and ultimately achieve financial well-being and financial resilience.2 The European Commission defines it as the knowledge and skills needed to make important financial decisions.3

The academic definition of financial literacy (Kaiser and Lusardi, 2024; Kuzina et al., 2024; Hastings et al., 2013) is “the knowledge of financial facts such as compound interest and financial products” (Fernandes et al., 2014). Importantly, this is an unobservable characteristic, and Kaiser et al. (2022) stress in their meta-analysis that there are no universally accepted instrumental variables to measure it.

Polling is the most common method of assessing respondents’ level of financial literacy. Researchers use various formulations and different numbers of questions. For example, to measure individual financial literacy, Reiche (2023) uses only three questions, while Agambaeva and Konurbaeva (2022) use six, Zvereva et al. (2024) use eight, Rumler and Valderrama (2020) use ten, and Fernandes et al. (2014) and Andreev et al. (2024) use thirteen questions.

According to the classification of Bruine de Bruin et al. (2010), the assessment of financial literacy usually includes questions about: (1) understanding inflation, (2) basic counting skills, and (3) advanced counting skills. For example, this is the approach used by Lusardi and Mitchell (2011).

At the same time, Van Rooij et al. (2011) suggest assessing the basic level of respondents’ financial literacy through their understanding of inflation and interest­ rates and the advanced level through their understanding of financial market instruments (stocks, bonds, and mutual funds). The first set of questions is meant to measure respondents’ ability to make simple calculations, work with compound interest rates, and discount cash flows over time. The second set is meant to assess respondents’ deeper financial knowledge by covering topics such as types of securities, securities market functions, the concept of risk diversification, and the relationship between bond prices and interest rates.

A separate line of research has focused on factors shaping financial literacy. For instance, Leung (2009) finds that the probability of a respondents’ answering inflation questions correctly depends on their socio-demographic characteristics. Based on a survey of 2,000 Dutch households, Van Rooij et al. (2011) also conclude that differences in the level of financial literacy are largely driven by respondents’ education, age, and gender. Specifically, women’s financial knowledge proves to be much lower than men’s. Respondents’ education is an important predictor of financial literacy, but only in combination with other characteristics. Kaiser and Lusardi (2024) conduct a meta-analysis of the existing literature and include income among the variables highly correlated with financial literacy. Kuzina et al. (2024) identify a similar set of factors underlying the level of financial literacy.

2.2. Drivers of heterogeneity of inflation expectations

The literature on the human perception of price growth reveals a persistent hetero­geneity in households’ inflation expectations. This heterogeneity is caused by differences in levels of financial literacy and by individuals’ socio-demographic characteristics. Recent studies have linked the heterogeneity of inflation expectations to the types of channels through which respondents obtain information.

2.2.1. Financial literacy and inflation expectations

The hypothesis that inflation expectations have a statistically significant inverse relationship with household financial literacy has been confirmed by a large number of studies (Supplementary material Appendix 1). In other words, the higher an individual’s financial literacy, the lower and more accurate their inflation expectations (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2010). For example, Gnan et al. (2011) find that the difference in the level of financial literacy among individuals­ is one of the key sources of the heterogeneity of economic agents’ inflation expectations both in the euro area as a whole and in individual countries. This is because people with deeper financial competence tend to perceive inflation more accurately and better understand how monetary policy works.

Arora et al. (2013) show an inverse correlation between inflation expectations and an individual’s level of macroeconomic knowledge. This conclusion holds true for both short- and long-term expectations (Rumler and Valderrama, 2020).

In their experiment, Burke and Manz (2014) establish that basic knowledge of monetary policy combined with financial literacy increases the accuracy of inflation forecasts. They argue that an individual’s level of financial literacy explains the heterogeneity of household inflation expectations better than socio-demographic factors do (Burke and Manz, 2014). For example, the differences in the median level of financial literacy between men and women explain the hetero­geneity of their inflation expectations (Reiche, 2023). Therefore, the inclusion of an indicator of the respondent’s financial literacy in the model fully closes the gender gap in inflation expectations. In their study, Bruine de Bruin et al. (2010) find that including the level of financial literacy in the regression analysis of expected inflation reduces the significance of socio-demographic factors such as education and income.

2.2.2. Socio-demographic determinants of heterogeneity of household inflation expectations

The following factors are identified as drivers of the heterogeneity of inflation expectations:

  • gender (Bryan and Venkatu, 2001; Pfajfar and Santoro, 2008; D’Acunto et al., 2022);
  • age (Blanchflower and MacCoille, 2009; Reiche, 2023);
  • marital status (Blanchflower and MacCoille, 2009);
  • real estate ownership (Blanchflower and MacCoille, 2009);
  • savings (Evstigneeva and Karpov, 2023);
  • place of residence (Hayo and Neumeier, 2018);
  • education and income levels of respondents (Pfajfar and Santoro, 2008; Gnan et al., 2011; D’Acunto et al., 2022; Supplementary material Appendix 1).

Bryan and Venkatu (2001) use University of Michigan surveys to show that women have consistently higher inflation expectations. Older respondents have significantly higher inflation expectations than younger people (Reiche, 2023). However, Gnan et al. (2011) find that of the socio-demographic factors, income and education are more important in explaining the differences in inflation expectations than gender and age. At the same time, researchers have yet to reach a consensus on how education and income influence household inflation expectations.

According to Agambaeva and Konurbaeva (2022), an increase in the level of education leads to a statistically significant increase in inflation expectations. A positive correlation is also evidenced by data from the Russian Survey of Consumer Finance (Andreev et al., 2024). The positive correlation between the education level and future inflation may be driven by the more pessimistic sentiment of the most educated people (the survey was conducted in 2022). This assumption also aligns with the conclusion that Russians equate economic crises with high inflation (Andreev et al., 2024; Evstigneeva and Karpov, 2023).

Burke and Manz (2014) find the coefficient for education to be positive but statistically insignificant. It is also found to be insignificant by Bruine de Bruin et al. (2010) and Binder and Rodrigue (2018). Reiche (2023) and Madeira and Zafar (2015) find a negative correlation between education and inflation expectations. Rumler and Valderrama (2020) conclude that an increase in the level of education pushes inflation expectations down only in the long term. At the same time, Leung (2009) finds a negative statistical relationship between education and expected inflation for both short- and long-term periods.

Researchers currently disagree on how inflation expectations depend on economic agents’ income. Rumler and Valderrama (2020) demonstrate that an increase in income leads to a statistically significant increase in inflation expectations both in the short and long term. Other studies find an inverse correlation (Lombardelli and Saleheen, 2003; Blanchflower and MacCoille, 2009; Angelico and Di Giacomo, 2019). The calculations of Bruine de Bruin et al. (2010) and Binder and Rodrigue (2018) show that income is statistically insignificant in the formation of inflation expectations.

Andreev et al. (2024) use Russian data to confirm the role of financial literacy and the socio-demographic characteristics of households (gender, age, education, income) in shaping expectations regarding future price trends. The expected change in a respondent’s financial standing is viewed as an independent driver of the heterogeneity of inflation expectations in Russia. The data suggest that pessimistic expectations for one’s own future go hand in hand with higher forecast inflation rates. However, we believe that this may reflect an inverse or bidirectional relationship, in which high inflation expectations shape negative expectations regarding future changes in welfare.

2.2.3. Channels through which individuals receive information

Based on a survey of German households, Conrad et al. (2022) conclude, that the type of information channel has significant implications for the heterogeneity of inflation expectations. They note that individuals relying on traditional media (newspapers, television) have lower and more accurate perceptions of inflation both for the current year and for the future period. The choice of information channel may be connected with the persistent differences in inflation expectations via the selection of news items and the media’s tone in describing them (Lamla and Lein, 2008; Evstigneeva and Karpov, 2023), as well as via the channel’s form of presenting information (Lamla and Lein, 2008; Binder and Rodrigue, 2018; Mirdamadi and Petersen, 2018).

For example, graphical presentation of information on past inflation reduces economic agents’ uncertainty about their inflation expectations and improves forecast accuracy (Binder and Rodrigue, 2018). In their experiment, Mirdamadi and Petersen (2018) compare the impact of qualitative information (describing the relationships between macroeconomic variables) and quantitative information (sets of equations) on household inflation expectations. The experiment demonstrates that providing participants with accurate quantitative information makes their inflation expectations much more accurate and less dependent on historical data.

The information channels used by respondents have a strong influence on their answers to the question about expected inflation, while in assessing future price movements, respondents tend to rely on their own consumer experience (Armantier et al., 2013). This includes the frequency of purchases, the share of spending on these goods in total income, the share of goods in the consumer basket, and observed price changes. Differences in consumer experience can lead to persistent differences in inflation expectations, especially when they stem from individual socio-demographic characteristics. The inclusion of the perception of current price movements in consumer experience raises the issue of whether inflation expectations are adaptive or rational. Current research suggests that ­assessments of the future price path are dominated by backward-looking motives (Conrad et al., 2022; Mirdamadi and Petersen, 2018; Sokolova, 2014).

2.3. Observed and expected inflation: Two sides of the same coin

Strictly speaking, perception of current price movements is not the same as inflation expectations. However, the two measures are closely related. In one of the earliest studies on the subject, Jonung (1981) uses survey data on Swedish consumers to show a significant positive correlation between observed and ­expected inflation: the correlation coefficient is about 0.5. Van der Klaauw et al. (2008) obtain a similar result for the United States. Blanchflower and Kelly (2008) and Duffy and Lunn (2009) show that groups whose perception of current inflation is biased develop biased inflation expectations.

At the same time, perception of current inflation plays a more significant role in the formation of inflation expectations than the actual level of inflation (Dräger, 2015). This result is consistent with the findings of Maag (2010) that Swedish households mainly build their inflation expectations on perceived rather than actual price trends. Moreover, households often predict a drop in inflation in a subsequent period if prices were up in the previous period, as well as increased inflation in the future if prices were down in the previous period (Abildgren and Kuchler, 2019; Zekaite, 2020).

As is the case for inflation expectations, the perception of current inflation generally differs across respondent groups, depending on gender, education, and income (Fritzer and Rumler, 2015; Arioli et al., 2017; European Commission, 2019). We have not been able to find studies focused on the role of financial literacy in subjective assessments of observed inflation.

Axelrod et al. (2018) show that perceived inflation remains an important predictor of inflation expectations if demographic characteristics are controlled for. Individuals who overestimate current inflation (such as women or low-income households) also tend to forecast higher inflation rates for the future. Other researchers report similar findings (Coibion et al., 2018; Detmeister et al., 2016; Coibion et al., 2020; Abildgren and Kuchler, 2019).

Household inflation expectations are thus formed on the basis of the perceived rate of current inflation (self-assessment of inflation), or households at least adhere to the same conception of prices in their assessments of current and future inflation. In this context, Abildgren and Kuchler (2019) conclude that the difference­ between households’ inflation expectations and their perception of current inflation may be more informative than the level of inflation expectations as such.

2.4. Pseudo-panel as data generation method

To analyze inflation expectations, researchers most often use consumer survey data and, less often, experimental results. We are able to explore survey results that enable an assessment of the inflation expectations and financial literacy of Russians, but the relevant questions were asked only in one wave of a single survey. To expand the body of information for this study, we combine the results of two household surveys using the pseudo-panel method first proposed by Deaton (1985) and Browning et al. (1985) and further developed by Gardes et al. (2005).

Unlike panel data, in which the objects (individuals) remain unchanged throughout the observation period, pseudo-panel data contain information about cohorts (stable groups of individuals). The observations in the pseudo-panel are the intracohort means, calculated as the mean values within the cohorts (Guillerm, 2017). This method has become standard practice in the literature. Supplementary material Appendix 2 presents the characteristics of selected studies that use pseudo-panels.

For example, Niizeki (2021) studies the impact of increased inflation expectations on household spending using pseudo-panel data, which are generated by combining three household-level microdata sets for Japan. Vellekoop and Wiederholt (2018) combine data from household surveys of inflation expectations with administrative data on income, assets, and liabilities to study the relationship between inflation expectations and net worth. Vellekoop and Wiederholt (2019) also analyze the relationship between inflation expectations and the propensity to save by combining survey data on quantitative inflation expectations with administrative data on household income and wealth.

However, since pseudo-panel studies involve grouping people with common characteristics, at least two key factors must be considered to obtain reliable and valid results: the criteria for cohort formation and, as a result, cohort size (or, vice versa, the search for criteria to form cohorts of the target size).

Many researchers agree that the cohort size should be large enough to limit the measurement error in the average values of the variables within cohorts and to avoid bias and inaccurate estimates of the model parameters (Verbeek, 2008; Dasgupta et al., 2015). However, since increasing the number of observations in a cohort reduces the possible number of cohorts given a certain number of observations, as noted by Guillerm (2017), the choice of cohort size is essentially a trade-off between bias and variance. For this reason, the appropriate number of observations in a cohort is usually left to the discretion of the researcher. According to Verbeek and Nijman (1992), 100–200 observations can in practice be a sufficient cohort size. This approach is supported by a number of other researchers (such as Attanasio et al., 2019, and Niizeki, 2021).

The method of constructing the cohorts deserves special attention. As Guillerm (2017) notes, the criteria for cohort formation should meet two requirements. First, they must be observable for all individuals and enable the division of the population (that is, each individual must fall into exactly one cohort). Second, they must correspond to characteristics of individuals that remain unchanged over time.

The most common criteria are year of birth (age), gender, and race (Dasgupta et al., 2015). A number of researchers have also suggested the individual’s region of residence as a criterion. However, there is no consensus as to how reasonable it is to build cohorts based on geography. For example, Verbeek (2008) endorses the division into cohorts based on an individual’s regional affiliation, but Niizeki (2021) finds its use as a criterion unreasonable, considering the risk that a household may change cohorts (that is, relocate).

2.5. Positioning within the relevant literature

The few studies that have examined inflation expectations in Russia have not considered financial literacy as a key determinant (Grishchenko et al., 2023; Evstigneeva and Karpov, 2023; Sokolova, 2014). Andreev et al. (2024) are the first to explore the relationship between financial literacy and the inflation expectations of Russian households. Zvereva et al. (2024) consider the relationship between financial literacy and inflation expectations in the broader context of the role of financial education in shaping Russians’ financial behavior. They do not ultimately find a strong relationship between inflation expectations and financial literacy, but they use only two binary variables as metrics for inflation expectations: inflation expectations relative to the median and inflation expectations for one year relative to actual inflation in June 2022.

We analyze a longer data series and use three survey waves (by Demoskop / Bank of Russia) rather than a single wave, as in the papers above. In addition, we use ten questions to measure respondents’ level of financial literacy, unlike other authors who analyze these data (Andreev et al., 2024; Zvereva et al., 2024; Kuzina et al., 2024). We use ordinary least squares (including fixed- and random-effects) and maximum likelihood methods, which are the most common in academic papers on the relationship between inflation expectations and financial literacy, as well as instrumental variables with controls for respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics.

Additionally, inFOM survey data enable us to analyze the relationship between financial literacy and short-, medium-, and long-term inflation expectations. This is important, since many authors (Rumler and Valderrama, 2020; Leung, 2009; Madeira and Zafar, 2015) note that the formation of inflation expectations varies across terms. Our study also assesses the relationship between financial literacy and the difference between expected and observed inflation. This remains unaddressed in the literature.

3. Information base and research strategy

Since 2018, the individual questionnaire of the All-Russian Survey of Consumer Finance, carried out by Demoskop on a biennial basis (jointly with the Bank of Russia since 2022), has included questions to measure the level of respondents’ financial knowledge. The 2022 survey also included questions about the level of respondents’ inflation expectations. The hypothesis of the relationship between inflation expectations and financial literacy can be tested on 2022 data, but that year was unusual for Russia. Most polling was conducted in April–June, when uncertainty among Russians about further developments was at its highest. As our paper shows, this affected the nature of the relationship between inflation expectations and financial literacy. To obtain more reliable conclusions, we build a pseudo-panel on a larger set of observations that combines Demoskop’s data and the results of inFOM’s monthly survey of Russians’ inflation expectations. Moreover, Demoskop’s survey lacks questions about short-term inflation expectations and the quantification of current price movements. This omission makes it impossible to determine the ratio of prospective and retrospective contributions to the formation of inflation expectations.

Demoskop’s and inFOM’s survey samples are representative at the country level and include about 12,000 and 2,000 respondents, respectively. See Andreev et al. (2024) for a detailed comparison of the characteristics of the two surveys. While noting differences in the samples and the wordings of certain questions, they conclude that “the patterns obtained from the household finance survey data can be extended to the data based on inFOM’s survey.” We also follow their recommendation that inFOM’s survey be used to assess inflation expectations because of its focus on the issue of interest.

We define our task as follows. First, we measure the level of ­financial literacy of the respondents in Demoskop’s survey. Second, we determine respondent characteristics that are common to the two surveys and use them to group the data from each survey. Third, we combine the results of the previous stage for each group at each point in time.

An individual’s level of financial literacy is a rather persistent characteristic, which allows us to determine the value of the financial literacy indicator for 2018, 2020, and 2022 for each group in all inFOM surveys for each year. To confirm this assumption, we divide the data of the Demoskop survey in each wave for each month of the survey into two subsamples approximately equal in size. In 2018 and 2020, the first subsamples are made up of questionnaires collected through March (53.0% and 49.9% of the total number of questionnaires, respectively). In 2022, 51.0% of respondents were interviewed through May. Next, we calculate the coefficient of variation of financial literacy between the two subsamples in each year for each group of respondents. The average and median values of the variation coefficients remain within 20% (Table 1). This means that the average level of financial literacy of the respondents did not change significantly within one year. This gives us a pseudo-panel of 32 time steps (inFOM surveys were suspended in 2020 for four months due to the pandemic), with the number of objects equal to the number of groups we form.

Table 1.

Intra-year coefficient of variation of financial literacy (%).

Statistic 2018 2020 2022
Average 16.2 15.0 15.1
Median 15.0 14.3 13.0

Next, we use the pseudo-panel dataset to assess the role of financial literacy in the formation of inflation expectations and in the difference between observed and future inflation.

4. Research methodology

4.1. Measuring financial literacy

Ten questions from Demoskop’s individual survey questionnaire (Supplementary material Appendix 3) are used to assess respondents’ financial literacy. The ­answers to each question are coded. A value of 1 is assigned for a correct answer and a value of 0 for all others, including the answer options “no answer” and “decline to answer,” etc. As the questions do not include topics that respondents are sensitive about, we treat the absence of a response indicating the respondent’s lack of knowledge. The sum of the binary scores for each respondent yields their financial literacy index, the value of which ranges from 0 to 10, with a higher value corresponding to higher financial literacy.

The questions can be grouped into several topics based on their content (deposit insurance system, accounting skills, understanding the effects of inflation, etc.). The thematic similarity of certain questions creates the risk of highly correlated responses, which could adversely affect the measurement of financial literacy and would require alternative algorithms to obtain the final indicator. However, in no case does the pairwise correlation coefficient of the responses exceed 0.5 (Supplementary material Appendix 4), which suggests minimal risk that the resulting estimates are distorted.

The distribution of respondents by financial literacy index level (Fig. 1) is shown for the panel as a whole and separately for each survey year. The average index rose from 5.31 in 2018 to 5.63 in 2020 but declined to 5.06 in 2022.4

Fig. 1.

Distribution of respondents by level of financial literacy index (% of total).

Source: Authors’ calculations.

This indicates that most respondents answered half the questions correctly, which points to an average level of financial literacy among Russians. Our results fall between the estimates made by Sinyakov and Shelovanova (2023) and Zvereva et al. (2024), in which the proportions of correct answers are 45–47% and 62–80%, respectively. The average value of the financial literacy index is numerically higher than the financial culture index (41.7 out of 100) calculated by Moscow State University and inFOM experts at the request of the Bank of Russia and the Russian Ministry of Finance based on data for 2024 H1. The difference may be due to the following reasons. First, as our estimates refer to earlier periods, Russians’ level of financial literacy may subsequently have changed. Second, the financial culture index reflects not only individuals’ knowledge but also the extent to which such knowledge is reflected in behavior. The questions we rely on to build the financial literacy index focus more on measuring the level of knowledge and people’s value assessments.

4.2. Formation of pseudo-panel

Our analysis of the literature, supported by our own calculations, allows us to identify three characteristics that are key to both financial literacy and inflation expectations when constructing the pseudo-panel: respondent’s gender, type of settlement, and the quintile of average per capita family income. They are used as grouping attributes for the results of the Demoskop and inFOM surveys, yielding 60 objects.

The type-of-settlement criterion includes six categories:

  • Moscow;
  • city of 1 million people or more other than Moscow;
  • city of 500,000 to 1 million people;
  • city of 100,000 to 500,000 people;
  • city of fewer than 100,000 people;
  • rural locality.

The breakdown of Demoskop respondents by type of settlement for the whole sample over three years is presented in Supplementary material Appendix 5. The differences in structure across waves are within one percentage point. The gender composition of the Demoskop sample is dominated by women (55%), reflecting the gender structure of the Russian population. The income characteristics of the pseudo-panel groups are described in Supplementary material Appendix 6.

For each of the 60 pseudo-panel objects based on the results of the Demoskop surveys, we calculate the average value of the financial literacy index and assign it to the corresponding object in each wave of the inFOM survey in 2018, 2020, and 2022, respectively.5 The values of the other indicators for each object also represent the average of the responses or the share of a specific response among all responses to the corresponding questions given by the respondents included in the object (cohort).

4.3. Modeling inflation expectations

Many researchers (Rumler and Valderrama, 2020; Leung, 2009; Madeira and Zafar, 2015) consider it necessary to analyze inflation expectations over different horizons separately, emphasizing that each of them is formed differently. Based on inFOM’s survey, we define a monthly horizon as the short term, an annual horizon as the medium term, and a three-year horizon as the long term. According to Das et al. (2019), the assessment of inflation expectations based on answers to qualitative questions may be more reliable. In this context, the relationship between inflation expectations and financial literacy is modeled for both qualitative and quantitative indicators of inflation expectations. The wording of the questions and the procedure for determining the dependent variable are provided in each table with the modeling results.

The variables we use are described in Supplementary material Appendix 7. The relationship between the indicators of interest is estimated controlling for socio-demographic characteristics: age, education, gender, employment, family size, and type of settlement. The level of well-being of an individual and their household is taken into account through the share of spending on food, subjective assessments of the adequacy of money to buy various goods, as well as changes in their own financial standing over the past year. Based on the Chow test, which shows the presence of structural shifts in 2020 and 2022, dummy variables are used for these periods (Covid and MPE respectively). In addition, certain equations include exchange rate movements and the MOEX VIX Index. The latter reflects stock market participants’ assessment of the level of risk, and stock market dynamics are considered a good measure of uncertainty about future developments in a country.

In addition to studying the nature of the correlation between inflation expectations and financial literacy, we test the relationship between financial literacy and the difference between respondents’ quantitative assessments of price movements for the future and the past 12 months. In other words, we seek to understand to what extent the differences between the inflation expectations of respondents with high and low levels of financial literacy are related to differences in their perception of current inflation and to what extent the differences are related to their perceptions of the future price path. Importantly, forward-looking and retrospective inflation estimates show a strong correlation (Fig. 2).

Fig. 2.

Correlation between estimates of observed inflation (horizontal axis) and expected inflation (vertical axis).

Source: Authors’ calculations.

We use two methods to reduce the risk of unreliable estimates arising from the endogeneity of the regressor. First, we use the two-stage least squares method, including versions with fixed and random effects. In testing the instruments for relevance and exogeneity, F-statistics are used to test the hypothesis that the estimates of all coefficients of instrumental variables in the first-stage equation are equal to zero, and the Sargan test is used thereafter. The null hypothesis of the latter is the exogeneity of all instruments. Endogeneity is checked using the Hausman test. The initial assumption of the test is the consistency of the least‑squares estimates and the instrumental variables estimate in the absence of endogeneity. If there is endogeneity, only the estimate of the instrumental variables is reliable. Second, the equations include lagged values of the financial literacy index and the instrumental variable based on the results of the previous wave of the survey.

5. Results

In the first stage of the study, we estimate the coefficients of models built on data from the single wave of the 2022 Demoskop survey, which was the most recent at the time of the study. Questions to measure the levels of both financial literacy and inflation expectations were asked simultaneously. The greatest difficulty in using the two-stage least squares method is finding a suitable instrumental variable. Two variables are used as instruments in this part of the study: form of savings and internet quality. The form of savings takes a value of 1 for the answer “in a bank account” to the question “What do you believe to be the best option for saving?” and 0 for other answers.

The form of savings is positively correlated with the financial literacy index. Our interpretation of this relationship is as follows. A preference for cashless money among financially knowledgeable individuals can be considered rational for the following reasons: (i) holding cash (the other response option) does not generate income; (ii) the state deposit insurance system protects depositors’ funds held by credit institutions; and (iii) the mature payment infrastructure boosts the liquidity of funds in bank accounts. However, respondents’ inflation expectations are not related to their responses about the form of savings.

The internet quality measure is 0, 1 or 2, corresponding to the answers unsatisfactory, satisfactory or good to the question “Rate the quality of internet­ access in your locality.” High-speed and stable internet access raises individuals­’ awareness of the basic principles of the financial market and of their rights as consumers of financial services. Thus, the quality of internet access is positively correlated with the level of financial literacy. However, it does not affect respondents’ inflation expectations in a statistically significant way. Our interpretation is as follows. Even if some relationship does exist, the direction of the effect varies significantly across cohorts of respondents, depending heavily on the content of online information the respondent is likely to consume, as well as on the respondent’s perception of such content. On the one hand, content produced by financial analysts is likely to imply a reduction in inflation expectations, as such expectations are typically lower for professional forecasters.6 On the other hand, the inflation expectations of non-professional commenters are more emotionally charged and may push the uncritical web-information consumer’s views in the opposite, upward direction. Hence, the influence of web access ultimately depends largely on the respondent’s educational background. From the econometric point of view, the relevance of the proposed instruments is confirmed by the first-stage F-statistics of the least squares procedure, which exceed the threshold level of 10. The exogeneity of the instruments was estimated based on the Sargan test (Supplementary material Appendix 8).

Respondents with high levels of financial literacy exhibit lower medium- and long-term inflation expectations (this survey did not ask questions regarding short-term inflation expectations). Estimates are made on the full and restricted samples to confirm the robustness of the results. The restricted sample excludes answers with inflation of more than 150% and 100% for the next 12 months and 3 years, respectively.

In the next step, the attributes that will form the basis of the pseudo-panel are identified. Taking advantage of both the Demoskop and inFOM surveys, we use gender, type of settlement, and relative financial position as group-forming features for the pseudo-panel. As the modeling results (Supplementary material Appendices 9–11) show, these respondent characteristics are quite closely related to their financial awareness and subjective assessments of future price dynamics.

As mentioned above, the critical attitude of certain authors toward the place of settlement (in the case of Japan) as a criterion for building a pseudo-panel is due to migration. However, migration does not seem very relevant to Russia because of the lower mobility of the population. In addition, our study has a rather short time horizon, which minimizes the potential error.

Data from the generated pseudo-panel are analyzed in the third step. The dependence of different metrics of inflation expectations on respondents’ financial literacy is shown graphically in Supplementary material Appendix 12. The instruments for further econometric analysis also include respondents’ answers to the question “What do you believe to be the best form of savings?” In addition, dummy variables for each of the years (2020 and 2022) are used separately. The inclusion of the corresponding dummy variables in the equations in the first stage of the two-stage least squares method reflects the structural shift previously diagnosed by the Chow test. The question about the form of savings was not asked in all the waves of the inFOM survey, so the calculations are built on 1,300 observations.

Answers to questions that do not imply a quantitative estimate of price growth (even in the form of suggested intervals) may also be useful for a more accurate understanding of respondents’ inflation expectations (Andreev et al., 2024). This is why our calculations include qualitative indicators of inflation expectations, which is an uncommon approach. Instrumental variable estimates of the coefficients of the financial literacy index confirm the importance of this factor in reducing inflation expectations, both for qualitative estimates of inflation expectations over all three time horizons (see Table 2 and Supplementary material Appendices 13–15) and for quantitative indicators (see Table 3 and Supplementary material Appendices 16–17).

Table 2.

OLS estimates for the FL index coefficient when the dependent variable is the qualitative indicator of inflation expectations.

How are prices expected to change in the next month? The share of responses “Prices will grow faster than now” How are prices expected to change in the next 12 months? The share of responses “Prices will grow faster than now” In three years, will price growth be higher or lower than or approximately 4%? Share of responses “approximately 4%”
FL index –0.123*** –0.047*** –0.240** –0.019** 0.103** 0.025**
Instruments/lagged FL Savings form (share), COVID FL index, first lag Savings form (share) FL index, first lag Savings form (share), COVID FL index, first lag
Appendix No. 13 18 14 19 15 20
Table 3.

OLS estimates for the FL index coefficient when the dependent variable is the quantitative indicator of inflation expectations.

By how much did the prices change in the past 12 months? By what percentage are prices expected to change in the next 12 months?
FL index –15.357** –14.297*** –6.968*** –6.046*
Instruments Savings form (share), COVID, MPE Savings form (share), first lag Savings form (share), COVID, MPE Savings form (share), first lag
Appendix No. 16 21 17 22

Our robustness check is based on another method for reducing endogeneity­: we include lagged values of the financial literacy index (see Table 2 and Supplementary material Appendices 18–20) and the instrumental variable (see Table 3 and Supplementary material­ Appendices 21–22) in the specifications. The estimates also show lower inflation expectations over all time horizons as financial literacy grows. In the case of long-term inflation expectations, it is probably­ more accurate to speak of a higher level of trust in the Bank of Russia’s monetary policy among financially competent respondents. The effect of an increase in the financial literacy index on inflation expectations is non-linear (Supplementary material Appendices 23–28): the difference in the level of inflation expectations per unit change in financial literacy is greater in the low-competence group than in the financially competent group. No signs of a quadratic or cubic dependence or structural shifts are identified, and the estimates of the coefficients of the corresponding variables prove to be statistically insignificant.

We then analyze to what extent the lower inflation expectations of financially competent respondents are driven by their perception of current price growth and to what extent by their assumptions about the future price path. As far as we know, Russians’ inflation expectations over the 12-month horizon are persistently lower than their observed annual inflation (in median values; Bank of Russia, 2024a). This raises the question of what causes this ratio and what role financial literacy plays in this.

To answer this question, we divide the respondents into three groups based on the ratio of estimates of future and observed price growth. Their distribution by the financial literacy index varies, but the differences are statistically insignificant (Supplementary material Appendix 34). The distribution line for those showing no difference in the estimates lies to the right of that for those who expect higher inflation in the future. The leftmost position is occupied by the distribution for the group of respondents who assume a deceleration relative to the estimate of current price trends. However, when the measure of observed inflation is included in the logit model, the estimate of the coefficient of the financial literacy index loses significance or takes on the opposite sign (Supplementary material Appendix 29).

The magnitude of observed inflation is negatively correlated with the likelihood of expected inflation remaining the same or rising. Accordingly, a higher assessment of the actual rate of price growth increases the likelihood that respondents indicate a lower value of future inflation. Each respondent may have a notion of certain “regular” pace of price growth and expects a return to this path when they feel that current dynamics are deviating from it. This aligns with the findings of other researchers (Abildgren and Kuchler, 2019; Zekaite, 2020).

The inflation estimates provided by respondents who give similar assessments of observed and expected price trends are in the range of 10–11%. Observed and expected inflation levels were closest in 2018–2020, when their median estimates were in the 8–12% range (Bank of Russia, 2024a).

An increase in financial literacy brings the values of expected and observed inflation closer, but the interaction effect of financial literacy and the subjective assessment of current price growth is positive and statistically significant (Supplementary material Appendix 30). The positive influence of observed inflation remains when the dependent variable is replaced with the ratio of the difference between expected and observed inflation (in absolute value) to observed inflation (Supplementary material Appendix 31). The phenomenon of a rising relative difference between expected and observed inflation as the perceived estimate of current inflation rises can be partially described in terms of the uncertainty of inflation expectations, which is the focus of Gurov et al. (2024). At the same time, when expected price growth is below observed price growth, growth of the latter is accompanied by a smaller deviation of expectations from the perception of current price dynamics. The level of financial literacy is not associated with a deviation of expected future price growth from current growth even per unit of observed inflation.

Therefore, the difference in the inflation expectations of respondents with different levels of financial literacy results primarily from the lower estimates of observed price growth among financially competent Russians. This is also evidenced by the convergence of observed inflation with Rosstat’s annual CPI (Supplementary material Appendices 32–33) as financial literacy increases. The financial literacy index retains its significance even after the specification of observed inflation is augmented with the cross variable as well as the CPI itself.

6. Conclusions

Relying on a longer data series, this study confirms the conclusion of Andreev et al. (2024) that a high level of financial literacy corresponds to lower inflation expectations. This dependence is observed for short-, medium- and long-term inflation expectations. The relationship identified is robust to the choice of measure of inflation expectations (qualitative/quantitative, current/future price growth) and to the method of estimating the specification. The effect of financial literacy on inflation expectations in Russia is non-linear: for a given difference in the level of financial literacy, the low-competence group has greater differences in inflation expectations than the financially competent group. This issue has been outside the scope of other studies based on Russian data.

All the assessment options controlled for the level of education, which highlights the value of financial literacy as an independent characteristic of individuals­ that does not fully coincide with their overall knowledge.

This study shows that the perception of current price dynamics contributes significantly to the formation of households’ inflation expectations. However, following Abildgren and Kuchler (2019) and Zekaite (2020), we find this dependence to be indirect. Respondents believe that current low price growth suggests a greater probability that inflation will increase in the future. Meanwhile, higher values of observed inflation are associated with the view that price dynamics will stabilize or decline in the future.

We find that financial literacy plays no significant role in the pass-through of observed inflation rates to the assessment of future price changes. Thus, the lower inflation expectations of financially competent Russians are primarily explained by their conservative assessment of observed price changes.

We propose the following reasons for this correlation (testing the validity of each would require a separate study).

First, an individual’s financial awareness implies a steady interest in economic information, which most likely includes statistical data on price movements. Respondents probably use this information, consciously or not, to answer the questions. Ash et al. (2024) describe the formation of inflation expectations by people who regularly follow business news.

Second, financially educated economic agents rely on more competent sources of information. Owing to their level of knowledge, they can correctly identify experts. Estimates of inflation rates provided by experts are usually more moderate­ than those from non-specialists in economics and finance. For example, over a long period, analysts’ inflation expectations in Russia have been anchored at close to 4% per year.

Third, economic awareness and a good grasp of economic principles suggest an understanding of inflation as an increase in the general level of prices for a basket of a large — but still limited — number of goods. The way economic agents perceive price dynamics can certainly be affected by the structure of individual consumption (about 600). When answering questions about price changes, especially past ones, respondents probably focus on goods and services that they purchase and/or on visible goods (Grishchenko et al., 2023). From this point of view, the subjective­ nature of inflation expectations may arise not so much from the personalized nature­ of expectations themselves as from the specificity of the consumer basket. Respondents with higher financial literacy may be better aware of the difference between rising prices for individual goods and overall price dynamics. Our findings are confirmed by the negative correlation between the level of financial literacy and the difference between observed inflation and the Rosstat value.

The analysis shows that the lower inflation expectations of Russians in the high financial literacy index group are driven by less biased estimates of current inflation. Thus, the Bank of Russia’s efforts to raise financial literacy will help reduce households’ inflation expectations and thereby deliver price stability. Our conclusion about the decreasing marginal effect of financial literacy on inflation expectations suggests that financial education activities will have a greater impact targeting the least financially knowledgeable audience.

Acknowledgments

This study was prepared as part of the work of the working group on the impact of financial literacy on economic indicators (OD-187). The authors would like to thank their colleagues for their discussion of the results at Bank of ­Russia research workshops. They are also grateful to Vadim Grishchenko, Tatiana Shelovanova, Andrey Sinyakov, and Sergey Ivashchenko for their valuable ideas and suggestions, the anonymous internal and external reviewers for their feedback, and Alina Vasilyeva and Azamat Marzaganov for their assistance in data processing.

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1 Directive of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 2958p, dated 24 October 2023, approving the Strategy for Improving Financial Literacy and Developing Financial Culture Until 2030: https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/document/?id_4=304737
2 OECD, Financial education portal: https://oecd.org/en/topics/financial-education.html
4 The chart in Fig. 1 and the dynamics of the average index are calculated for the respondents included in the pseudo-panel (those who report an annual income of at least 100 rubles). For the full sample, the average values of the index are 5.17, 5.46, and 4.93, respectively.
5 The authors are ready to provide data on the distribution of observations by object-month upon request.
6 Macroeconomic survey of the Bank of Russia. http://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/ddkp/mo_br/
☆ The views expressed in the paper are solely those of the authors. The content and results of this research should not be considered or referred to in any publications as the Bank of Russia official position, official policy, or decisions. Any errors in this paper are the responsibility of the authors.

Supplementary material

Supplementary material 1 

Technical Annex

Karen A. Tumanyants, Fyodor B. Kuleshov, Henry I. Penikas, Vasily E. Zuev

Data type: Text

This dataset is made available under the Open Database License (http://opendatacommons.org/ licenses/odbl/1.0/). The Open Database License (ODbL) is a license agreement intended to allow­ users to freely share, modify, and use this dataset while maintaining this same freedom for others, provided that the original source and author(s) are credited.
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