Research Article |
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Corresponding author: Heba Helmy ( hezz@msa.edu.eg ) © 2025 Non-profit partnership “Voprosy Ekonomiki”.
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0), which permits to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes, provided that the article is not altered or modified and the original author and source are credited.
Citation:
Helmy H (2025) Probing the exchange rate’s asymmetric reaction to oil price changes in the new BRICS Plus group. Russian Journal of Economics 11(2): 123-143. https://doi.org/10.32609/j.ruje.11.146303
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We aim to show how any variants of a unified currency among BRICS Plus countries are challengeable, by probing the disparate influence of the positive and negative alterations in the crude oil’s international price on the real effective exchange rates. The paper applies the nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag approach to separate oil price upswings from downswings and assesses how such changes asymmetrically affect the real effective exchange rates of BRICS Plus members in the short and long runs using monthly time series variables from January 2000 until July 2023. Our findings reveal that in the short run, the asymmetric impacts of the positive and negative oil price changes on the real effective exchange rates appear in all BRICS Plus countries. In the long run, Brazil and Argentina confirmed the asymmetric impact of oil price changes on their real effective exchange rates, while the symmetric impact is confirmed in Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and Ethiopia. Our findings prove that a unified currency or a unified monetary union is a very challenging idea, as continuous appreciations or depreciations of the local currencies of BRICS Plus countries will have to be implemented to preserve their alignment with the composite currency unit. Moreover, the asymmetric responses will induce diverse policy recommendations concerning the oil pricing. Our study comes to fill a vital lacuna in the literature as it is the first study to probe the asymmetric association between the oil’s international price and the real effective exchange rate in the BRICS Plus countries.
exchange rate, oil price, ARDL, NARDL, BRICS Plus
On August 24, 2023, the BRICS group of emerging economies comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa agreed to invite six new members, namely Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Iran, Argentina, Egypt, and Ethiopia, to join the agglomeration in what would be potentially entitled BRICS Plus (Business Standard, 2023).
One of the aims announced by the Brazilian president in the last BRICS conference that took place on August 22–24, 2023 in Johannesburg, South Africa, was the creation of a unified currency of BRICS members for trade and investment among them. While the proposed currency is meant to decrease dependence on the U.S. dollar to reduce the uncertainty associated with the dollar’s fluctuations, many economists pointed out the difficulty of its implementation, given the diverse economic, political, and geographical structures of the member states (
Theoretically, oil price can influence the exchange rate via two trajectories: first, through the balance of payments, as any oil price rise will lead to the movement of capital from the oil-importing countries to the oil-exporting ones; second, through the terms of trade; since oil is considered a tradable input, a rise in the price of which will lead to a fall in the price of the non-tradable input — labor — in this two-country model, so that the goods of the tradable sector remain competitive. As the non-tradable sector uses more energy, commodities of the non-tradable sector would eventually increase leading to a rise in the exchange rate (
Concerning the BRICS Plus members, the pass-through of the oil price change to the exchange rate is expected to vary due to two main factors. Firstly, some members are major oil-exporters (Russia, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, Brazil) while others are major oil-importers (China, India); therefore, the impact of oil price changes on their balance of payments, and hence their REERs, will be different. Secondly, the adoption of different exchange regimes by the group members can ease or restrain the oil price change pass-through to REER. For example, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been pegging their currencies to the U.S. dollar ever since 1986 and 1997 respectively, while Argentina did so from 1990 until 2002 when the system was finally abandoned and the country converted to a floating exchange rate regime. Brazil adopts a floating exchange rate regime
Although the first wave of researches tackling the oil price-exchange rate relation comprised a myriad of studies they all assumed linearity (see for example,
In fact, the extant literature comprises ample discussions on the asymmetric oil price-exchange rate nexus in developing and developed countries using multiple econometric techniques.
Few studies were centered on BRICS countries, such as that by
Despite its extensiveness, the extant literature on the oil price–exchange rate nexus pinpoints some caveats. First, no study was ever done on BRICS Plus members. This is a fundamental gap in the literature as two of the world’s major producers and exporters of oil — Saudi Arabia and the UAE — have recently joined the agglomeration. Consequently, it is vital to compare the impact of oil price changes on their exchange rates with that of other old members, especially with the intention of the group to create a common monetary union or even a common currency. Besides, no studies were ever done on the oil price-exchange relationship in some new BRICS Plus members such as Ethiopia. Second, very few studies were done using the real effective exchange rate, rather than the official exchange rate or the real exchange rate. As mentioned earlier, Saudi Arabia and the UAE peg their currencies to the U.S. dollar, therefore any impact of oil price changes on the official exchange rate as done in the previous studies will appear insignificant if there was no impact of the oil price change on the U.S. dollar. Our study overcomes this deficiency. Summing up, our study comes to fill a vital lacuna in the literature as it is the first study ever to investigate the asymmetric link between the international oil price and REER in the new BRICS Plus countries.
To probe the association between REER and the international price of oil in the BRICS Plus countries, we use monthly data starting 2000M1 until 2023M7. LREER is the monthly real effective exchange rate (CPI-based) in natural logs. The real effective exchange rate, obtained from Bruegel database,
Evolution of BRICS Plus real effective exchange rates (LREER), and the international oil price in natural logs, 2000M1–2023M7.
Note: REER is the monthly real effective exchange rate (CPI-based). LOIL is crude oil average spot price per barrel of Brent, Dubai and West Texas Intermediate, equally weighed. The acronyms of China, Russia, India, Brazil, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, Argentina, Egypt and Ethiopia are CN, RU, IN, BR, ZA, SA, AE, IR, AR, EG, and ET respectively, and are added to the REER acronym. All variables are transformed to their natural logs and have the letter “L” added to the country-real effective exchange rate acronym. Source: IndexMundi data portal.
We begin by constructing our general long run equation as follows:
LREERt = a 0 + a1 LOILt + vt, (1)
where LREER and LOIL were defined earlier, while v is the error term that embodies the excluded factors which may influence the evolution of BRICS Plus’s real effective exchange rates and is assumed to be iid. To grasp the short-run response of the international oil price change, we can redraft equation (1) in an Error Correction Model (ECM) format, and estimate the coefficients that are attached to the first differenced variables. To capture the long-run impact of the international oil price change, we can examine the coefficients that are attached to the lagged levels of oil price (equation 2):
. (2)
Equation (2) also includes a dummy variable DUMt = (DUM1t, ..., DUMjt), which accounts for any major structural break in the time series. The dummy variable has a value equal to 1 if the observation belongs to the jth period and 0 if it exists in any other period. Variables that are integrated of different I(0) and I(1) orders are co-integrated if there exists a linear combination between the two variables and they share a common trend. To test for co-integration, a formal F-test is conducted with critical bounds (
. (3)
The linear ARDL model in equation (3) assumes that the reactions of REER to any changes from the oil prices are symmetric, an assumption which has recently been challenged as previously mentioned, as it neglects assessing the potential differences in the influences of positive and negative oil prices shocks on the real effective exchange rate (see, for example, Gbato et al., 2017;
(4)
where and are fractional sum processes of positive and negative changes in LOIL.
They are calculated as follows:
(5)
(6)
where and are positive and negative changes in the crude oil’s international price. Any increases or decreases in the international price of oil are revealed by the long-run parameters δ+ and δ– respectively. Substituting LOIL in the linear ARDL model of equation (2) by the fractional sum processes of positive and negative changes in LOIL — LOILt+ and LOILt– — we obtain the following NARDL model:
(7)
Nonlinearities in short and long-run ARDL models can be expressed by the positive and negative components of the regressors (
Following the same logic but concerning the short run, we test the null hypothesis of symmetry in the short-run impact of the rises and falls in the international oil price on LREERs, or
(8)
Short run asymmetric impacts of oil price changes exist if the null hypothesis is rejected. In addition, if the fractional sum processes in the independent variable take different lags, then this will imply that there is asymmetry in short-run adjustments.
We display the descriptive statistics in two separate Tables
| Descriptive statistics | LOIL | LCNREER | LRUREER | LINREER | LBRREER | LZAREER |
| Mean | 4.052510 | 4.753170 | 4.465634 | 4.672297 | 4.448978 | 4.538153 |
| Median | 4.115940 | 4.752728 | 4.490096 | 4.679350 | 4.471753 | 4.515136 |
| Maximum | 4.889070 | 4.988458 | 4.801723 | 4.878627 | 4.841506 | 4.786575 |
| Minimum | 2.918850 | 4.489423 | 3.868489 | 4.464298 | 3.867444 | 4.245204 |
| St. deviation | 0.481860 | 0.149090 | 0.187635 | 0.136899 | 0.211353 | 0.124577 |
| Skewness | –0.418099 | –0.118120 | –0.600218 | 0.006646 | –0.310334 | –0.036862 |
| Kurtosis | 2.184893 | 1.540140 | 3.013527 | 1.424229 | 2.292698 | 2.156950 |
| Descriptive statistics | LSAREER | LAEREER | LIRREER | LARREER | LEGREER | LETREER |
| Mean | 4.804234 | 4.532418 | 5.060969 | 4.491965 | 4.836070 | 4.768304 |
| Median | 4.819636 | 4.514041 | 4.939998 | 4.499699 | 4.895000 | 4.799420 |
| Maximum | 4.982921 | 4.706011 | 6.410701 | 5.517935 | 5.178182 | 5.290336 |
| Minimum | 4.590665 | 4.352598 | 4.417032 | 3.843744 | 4.416186 | 4.395683 |
| St. deviation | 0.106274 | 0.088661 | 0.519752 | 0.386786 | 0.201283 | 0.235576 |
| Skewness | –0.335466 | 0.061658 | 0.834252 | 1.014337 | –0.463297 | 0.165601 |
| Kurtosis | 1.796824 | 1.908460 | 2.693317 | 4.217321 | 2.004665 | 1.835994 |
Despite the log transformation, some new member’s data such as the real exchange rate of Argentina (LARREER) displays leptokurtic (Kurtosis > 3.0) implying a distribution with long tails (outliers). This might have been due to Argentina’s long history of anchoring its currency (the peso) with the U.S. dollar through the currency board system before finally abandoning the system in the second half of 2001, a policy that led to a sharp depreciation of the currency in the years that followed. It can also be discernable that the maximum logged values of REER of some new members, Iran, Argentina, Egypt, and Ethiopia were 6.42, 5.52, 5.18, and 5.29 respectively, all exceeding the 4.9 limit of the old members. Such values imply that the new members had episodes of overvalued real exchange rates indicative of a loss of competitiveness that accompanies an overvalued exchange rate pegged at higher-than-market equilibrium rates.
We employ the Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) and Philips–Perron (PP) tests (Table
| Variable | Level | First difference | ||||
| Intercept | Intercept and trend | Intercept | Intercept and trend | |||
| ADF test | ||||||
| LOIL | –2.462856 | –2.721701 | –12.35088*** | –12.32917*** | ||
| LCNREER | –0.970463 | –1.553994 | –12.58886*** | –12.57134*** | ||
| LRUREER | –3.519073*** | –3.210287* | –10.95561*** | –11.12509*** | ||
| LINREER | –1.133846 | –3.220616* | –14.37328*** | –14.34731*** | ||
| LBRREER | –1.903802 | –1.880015 | –12.14835*** | –12.13169*** | ||
| LZAREER | –2.693648* | –3.192717* | –13.99863*** | –13.97392*** | ||
| LSAREER | –1.047117 | –2.019695 | –12.57739*** | –12.62420*** | ||
| LAEREER | –1.581914 | –2.795137 | –11.03543*** | –11.01909*** | ||
| LIRREER | –0.789374 | –1.774326 | –16.30669*** | –16.52542*** | ||
| LARREER | –2.537871 | –3.377080* | –9.49531*** | –9.54727*** | ||
| LEGREER | –2.200718 | –2.453121 | –14.04601*** | –14.02518*** | ||
| LETREER | –0.377939 | –3.243087 | –10.91316*** | –10.97113*** | ||
| PP test | ||||||
| LOIL | –2.258174 | –2.409701 | –11.87318*** | –11.84337*** | ||
| LCNREER | –1.077307 | –1.435271 | –12.68006*** | –12.66291*** | ||
| LRUREER | –3.214442** | –2.667241 | –12.17074*** | –12.34212*** | ||
| LINREER | –1.106288 | –2.854142 | –14.24848*** | –14.22041*** | ||
| LBRREER | –1.823579 | –1.774961 | –12.10781*** | –12.09028*** | ||
| LZAREER | –2.593254* | –3.065264 | –13.99863*** | –13.97392*** | ||
| LSAREER | –0.968895 | –1.882914 | –12.52098*** | –12.56129*** | ||
| LAEREER | –1.479114 | –2.557905 | –11.00088*** | –10.98393*** | ||
| LIRREER | –0.845959 | –1.795142 | –16.30665*** | –16.52402*** | ||
| LARREER | –2.389870 | –2.846917 | –9.25564*** | –9.25926*** | ||
| LEGREER | –2.031179 | –2.247110 | –14.03697*** | –14.01581*** | ||
| LETREER | –0.349225 | –2.935164 | –11.01775*** | –11.03982*** | ||
We also test for unit roots with structural breaks (Table
| Variable | Level | Break date | First difference |
| LOIL | –5.058192* | 2014M09 | –13.53031*** |
| LCNREER | –2.455190 | 2012M10 | –13.19615*** |
| LRUREER | –5.803951*** | 2014M07 | –15.63587*** |
| LINREER | –4.212050 | 2009M09 | –14.92560*** |
| LBRREER | –4.341303 | 2008M12 | –13.00785*** |
| LZAREER | –4.676673 | 2002M09 | –15.14949*** |
| LSAREER | –3.882124 | 2008M07 | –13.49427*** |
| LAEREER | –3.552239 | 2014M07 | –11.27433*** |
| LIRREER | –6.267758*** | 2002M02 | –37.21548*** |
| LARREER | –7.156907*** | 2001M12 | –11.10770*** |
| LEGREER | –3.253378 | 2016M10 | –21.04159*** |
| LETREER | –4.045500 | 2010M09 | –12.75905*** |
The breakpoint unit root tests demonstrated that the logged exchange rates of all except for three (Russia, Iran, and Argentina) members have unit roots at levels and that the time series turned stationary when first differenced. To overcome assigning multiple dummy variables accounting for every structural break in each country, we therefore allow for one dummy at the most probable structural break date when estimating the ARDL and NARDL models of each member country.
We employ Brook et al. (1996) BDS to test for the nonlinearity of the logged oil price and the logged exchange rates of the BRICS Plus countries. Results demonstrated in Table
| BDS statistics series | Dimension 2 | Dimension 3 | Dimension 4 | Dimension 5 | Dimension 6 |
| LOIL | 0.177203*** | 0.297551*** | 0.37659*** | 0.426526*** | 0.455949*** |
| LCNREER | 0.196633*** | 0.333594*** | 0.427687*** | 0.491720*** | 0.534404*** |
| LRUREER | 0.178136*** | 0.299737*** | 0.382166*** | 0.434160*** | 0.466747*** |
| LINREER | 0.194565*** | 0.328898*** | 0.420763*** | 0.483094*** | 0.524217*** |
| LBRREER | 0.181152*** | 0.304066*** | 0.385469*** | 0.437619*** | 0.469117*** |
| LZAREER | 0.163246*** | 0.271414*** | 0.340237*** | 0.382076*** | 0.404567*** |
| LSAREER | 0.187931*** | 0.316539*** | 0.403721*** | 0.462254*** | 0.500167*** |
| LAEREER | 0.179838*** | 0.301948*** | 0.384948*** | 0.440661*** | 0.476946*** |
| LIRREER | 0.194636*** | 0.328241*** | 0.419972*** | 0.482828*** | 0.526208*** |
| LARREER | 0.179838*** | 0.301948*** | 0.384948*** | 0.440661*** | 0.476946*** |
| LEGREER | 0.188874*** | 0.318748*** | 0.405739*** | 0.462104*** | 0.497168*** |
| LETREER | 0.189227*** | 0.317821*** | 0.405097*** | 0.464138*** | 0.503151*** |
In this section, we examine the impact of oil price changes on the exchange rate and determine whether the effects are symmetric or asymmetric. For that purpose, the linear and nonlinear ARDL models are estimated by the OLS method. We allow for a maximum of 12 lags and use AIC to choose the optimal number of lags. Table
Linear ARDL model coefficient estimates and diagnostic checks (model selection — AIC).
| CN | RU | IN | BR | ZA | SA | AE | IR | AR | EG | ET | |
| A. Short-run estimates of ARDL models (dependent variable LREER) | |||||||||||
| D(LOIL) | –0.014211** | 0.071011*** | 0.079296*** | –0.037785*** | –0.032582*** | –0.076651 | –0.022898 | –0.020331 | |||
| D(LOIL(–1)) | 0.037698* | –0.001436 | |||||||||
| D(LOIL(–2)) | 0.031181 | 0.014820** | |||||||||
| D(LOIL(–3)) | –0.022856*** | ||||||||||
| OILDUM | Excluded | Excluded | 0.019307*** | –0.010906** | –0.013073*** | 0.003362 | 0.008151*** | 0.068381*** | –0.031535*** | 0.016837* | 0.022595 |
| REERDUM | 0.006145*** | –0.010820*** | 0.020692*** | 0.009831** | 0.031330*** | 0.002889** | –0.006469*** | –0.155375*** | –0.075648*** | –0.018332* | –0.002614 |
| D(LREER(–1)) | 0.297849*** | 0.263496*** | 0.196349*** | 0.279179*** | 0.117350** | 0.219451*** | 0.366786*** | 0.485843*** | 0.164648*** | 0.342487*** | |
| D(LREER(–2)) | –0.034582 | –0.026012 | –0.075362 | –0.090866 | |||||||
| D(LREER(–3)) | –0.028597 | –0.125667** | 0.084512 | ||||||||
| D(LREER(–4)) | 0.195235*** | 0.029239 | |||||||||
| D(LREER(–5)) | –0.076517 | 0.022223 | |||||||||
| D(LREER(–6)) | –0.152235*** | ||||||||||
| CointEq(–1)* | –0.027743*** | –0.149852*** | –0.135181*** | –0.045008*** | –0.073765*** | –0.026042*** | –0.048881*** | –0.073695*** | –0.080156*** | –0.038800*** | –0.048599*** |
| B. Long-run estimates of ARDL models (dependent variable LREER) | |||||||||||
| LOIL | 0.133831** | 0.306978*** | 0.012765 | 0.229727** | –0.173161* | 0.020891 | 0.097377*** | 0.887734*** | –0.006033 | 0.289259* | 0.340403*** |
| C | 4.130043*** | 3.233084*** | 4.481355*** | 3.468547*** | 4.900368*** | 4.614054*** | 4.214241*** | 3.076499*** | 5.508621*** | 3.613305*** | 3.273535*** |
| C. Diagnostic tests | |||||||||||
| CointEq(–1)* | –0.027743*** | –0.149852*** | –0.135181*** | –0.045008*** | –0.073765*** | –0.026042*** | –0.048881*** | –0.073695*** | –0.080156*** | –0.038800*** | –0.048599*** |
| Adj. R2 | 0.158639 | 0.202520 | 0.109319 | 0.150850 | 0.188245 | 0.212968 | 0.287604 | 0.104514 | 0.347236 | 0.063266 | 0.246917 |
| Serial correlation LM test (Obs. R2) | 3.593615 | 0.265571 | 1.906653 | 1.396706 | 0.080956 | 0.348854 | 1.332497 | 0.637610 | 1.157641 | 0.502461 | 0.988724 |
| Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey heteroskedasticity test (Obs. R2) | 14.237570 | 72.085760*** | 12.09365** | 44.76919*** | 17.683730 | 14.59553 | 20.097300*** | 36.080800*** | 25.100670*** | 7.333591 | 5.153811 |
| Ramsey RESET (t-statistic) | 1.600606 | 1.906249* | 0.541167 | 0.085364 | 0.191940 | 1.057903 | 0.254765 | 3.277881*** | 3.467799*** | 2.539540 | 1.803708* |
| CUSUM | Stable | Stable | Stable | Stable | Stable | Stable | Unstable | Unstable | Unstable | Stable | |
| CUSUM SQ | Stable | Unstable | Stable | Stable | Stable | Stable | Unstable | Unstable | Unstable | Unstable | |
| ARDL | (6, 1) | (4, 0) | (2, 0) | (7, 3) | (2, 4) | (3, 1) | (1, 1) | (2, 0) | (2, 1) | (2, 1) | |
| F-bounds test | 4.552280** | 11.041120*** | 9.934158*** | 8.364385*** | 3.123356 | 8.162165*** | 8.834948*** | 12.794170*** | 3.994561* | 10.251110*** | |
| Observations | 277 | 279 | 281 | 276 | 279 | 280 | 282 | 281 | 281 | 281 | |
The negative and significant ECT term suggests that cointegration exists in all eleven countries. However, at the 5% significance level or lower, the F-bounds test in Panel C suggests weak cointegration in Brazil and Egypt, and no cointegration in the case of Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Panel B shows that in four countries oil prices have no or weak statistically significant long-run coefficient estimates. Finally, the diagnostic checks in Panel C show no evidence of residual serial correlation; however, there is evidence of heteroskedasticity in six countries and model misspecification and instability in Iran and Argentina.
To assess whether the possible lack of cointegration (as proposed by the F-bounds test) in some countries in addition to some model misspecifications was a result of neglected non-linearity in the models, we apply the NARDL model in equation (7). Table
| CN | RU | IN | BR | ZA | SA | AE | IR | AR | EG | ET | |
| A. Short-run estimates of NARDL models (dependent variable LREER) | |||||||||||
| D(LOIL_POS) | –0.043947 | 0.047888 | –0.033966** | –0.015809 | –0.277404** | ||||||
| D(LOIL_POS(–1)) | 0.080873 | 0.034941 | 0.006114 | ||||||||
| D(LOIL_POS(–2)) | –0.091009** | 0.033432** | |||||||||
| D(LOIL_POS(–3)) | –0.033610*** | ||||||||||
| D(LOIL_NEG) | –0.024031** | 0.148242*** | 0.092542*** | 0.123117*** | –0.039275*** | –0.039029*** | –0.036532** | ||||
| D(LOIL_NEG(–1)) | 0.012696 | –0.064671 | –0.153629** | ||||||||
| D(LOIL_NEG(–2)) | 0.006557 | – 0.056959 | 0.111136* | ||||||||
| D(LOIL_NEG(–3)) | –0.023100** | –0.136445** | |||||||||
| D(LOIL_NEG(–4)) | 0.104316* | ||||||||||
| D(LOIL_NEG(–4)) | –0.053887 | ||||||||||
| OILDUM | Excluded | Excluded | 0.015181*** | Excluded | Excluded | 0.008751*** | 0.013216*** | –0.084780*** | Excluded | Excluded | 0.027445*** |
| REERDUM | 0.007381*** | Excluded | 0.020097*** | 0.018231*** | 0.033136*** | 0.005749*** | –0.005669*** | –0.315543*** | –0.086222*** | –0.020542*** | Excluded |
| D(LREER(–1)) | 0.302855*** | 0.267234*** | 0.204181*** | 0.283503*** | 0.142541** | 0.199369*** | 0.348691*** | 0.479930*** | 0.176259*** | 0.321689*** | |
| D(LREER(–2)) | –0.038754 | –0.091951 | –0.110891** | ||||||||
| D(LREER(–3)) | –0.042109 | 0.099230* | |||||||||
| D(LREER(–4)) | 0.174863*** | 0.011971 | |||||||||
| D(LREER(–5)) | –0.112542* | 0.016077 | |||||||||
| D(LREER(–6)) | –0.160144*** | ||||||||||
| CointEq(–1)* | –0.021159*** | –0.156383*** | –0.147737*** | – 0.059189*** | –0.080399*** | –0.023967*** | –0.041326*** | –0.164479*** | –0.104771*** | –0.040335*** | –0.043239*** |
| B. Long-run estimates of NARDL models (dependent variable LREER) | |||||||||||
| LOIL_POS | 0.239621 | 0.337632*** | –0.001238 | 0.287658*** | –0.101732 | 0.114636 | 0.186761** | 0.047392 | 0.122787** | 0.077250 | 0.459584*** |
| LOIL_NEG | 0.275671 | 0.347746*** | –0.012199 | 0.345691*** | –0.067075 | 0.179346 | 0.220690** | –0.235798* | 0.212014*** | –0.015035 | 0.506710** |
| C | 4.528875*** | 4.239597*** | 4.510822*** | 4.315111*** | 4.400465*** | 4.691968*** | 4.533233*** | 5.808478*** | 5.519495*** | 4.491462*** | 4.344622*** |
| C. Diagnostic tests | |||||||||||
| CointEq(–1)* | –0.022140*** | –0.156383*** | –0.147737*** | –0.059189*** | –0.080399*** | –0.023967*** | –0.041326*** | –0.164479*** | –0.104771*** | –0.040335*** | –0.043239*** |
| Adj. R2 | 0.167921 | 0.200674 | 0.115786 | 0.155355 | 0.201822 | 0.232878 | 0.296236 | 0.191814 | 0.383065 | 0.061255 | 0.256161 |
| Serial correlation LM test (Obs. R2) | 0.878402 | 0.162447 | 1.995704 | 0.092589 | 0.147709 | 1.767936 | 2.068643 | 4.571368 | 4.546590 | 0.041566 | 0.622357 |
| Breusch–Pagan–Godfrey heteroskedasticity test (Obs. R2) | 17.449740 | 85.686530*** | 11.931280* | 47.514440*** | 27.12563* | 30.152660*** | 27.293970*** | 70.711030*** | 18.155350*** | 8.814104 | 4.027823 |
| Ramsey RESET (t-statistic) | 1.429269 | 1.496391 | 1.167755 | 0.216072 | 0.079681 | 0.727857 | 0.269815 | 6.229605*** | 2.699149*** | 2.071561** | 2.475228** |
| CUSUM | Stable | Stable | Stable | Stable | Stable | Stable | Stable | Unstable | Unstable | Unstable | Stable |
| CUSUM SQ | Stable | Unstable | Stable | Stable | Stable | Stable | Stable | Unstable | Unstable | Unstable | Stable |
| ARDL | (6, 0, 4) | (2, 2, 3) | (2, 0, 0) | (2, 0, 1) | (7, 2, 5) | (2, 4, 1) | (3, 1, 1) | (1, 1, 0) | (2, 0, 0) | (2, 0, 0) | 2, 0, 1) |
| F-bounds test | 3.635973* | 8.625779*** | 8.625779*** | 3.241466 | 6.362458*** | 3.631662* | 7.209818*** | 13.590800*** | 14.060220*** | 2.686620* | 8.870973*** |
| Observations | 277 | 279 | 281 | 281 | 276 | 278 | 280 | 291 | 281 | 281 | 281 |
When asymmetries in the effect of oil prices on the real exchange rate are permitted, we find evidence of long-term relationships between oil prices and REER as indicated by the significant and negative ECT term. The F-statistic of the bounds test also supports long run cointegration at the 5- and 10-percent significance levels in all countries except for Brazil and Saudi Arabia. If we take at least one indicator to support the long-run cointegration of the oil price–REER relationship, we can conclude that cointegration exists in all BRICS Plus countries. However, a clear caveat appears in the diagnostic tests for the results of the models of three countries — Iran, Argentina, and Egypt. While the tests for all the other countries’ models prove that the relationship is not spurious, the models of the three aforementioned countries clearly suffer from model misspecification and instability as evident from the Ramsey RESET test and the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ stability tests. Accordingly, the results of the three countries should be taken with caution. In the case of Ethiopia, the Ramsey RESET test shows evidence of misspecification, yet both CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests depict a stable relation. The results were robust whether the estimation was done using a constant and trend as fixed regressors or keeping them restricted to the cointegrating equation. Moreover, all models do not suffer from serial correlation.
Focusing on the short results in Panel A we find short-run evidence that in China, UAE, and Ethiopia only decreases in oil prices (OIL–) raise REER, signaling an asymmetric relation. The asymmetric relation also exists in Russia and Brazil, although in their cases the negative impact of a fall in oil prices leads to decreases in REERs. Both positive and negative alterations in oil prices had impacts on the REERs of South Africa, and Saudi Arabia in the short run; however, in the case of South Africa a positive change in oil prices decreases REER, whereas a negative change seems to have an oscillating effect on REER decreasing, increasing and again decreasing REER in the months that follow the change. The opposite takes place in Saudi Arabia where the positive change in oil price seems to have an oscillating effect on REER, decreasing it instantaneously, increasing it after two months, and finally decreasing it after the third month; while a negative shock in oil price leads to a rise in REER. The impact is also asymmetric in Iran with only positive changes leading to a fall in the REER. There are no short-run impacts in India, Argentina, and Egypt.
Focusing on the long-run asymmetric relation we find that there are no significant distinct positive or negative long-run impacts of oil prices on the exchange rate in China, India, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Egypt. However, positive and negative impacts exist in the cases of Russia, Brazil, UAE, Argentina and Ethiopia. In Iran, only the negative changes in oil prices seem important at the 10% significance level leading to rises in REER in the long run.
Table
| Country | Linear ARDL model LREER = f (LOIL) | Non-linear ARDL model LREER = f (LOIL+, LOIL–) | ||||||||||
| Short-run effects of LOIL | Long-run effects of LOIL | Cointegration | Short-run effects of LOIL | Long-run effects of LOIL | Cointegration | |||||||
| LOIL+ | LOIL– | LOIL+ | LOIL– | |||||||||
| China | – | + | Yes | N.E. | – | N.S. | N.S. | Yes | ||||
| Russia | N.E. | + | Yes | N.S. | + | + | + | Yes | ||||
| India | N.E. | N.S. | Yes | N.E. | N.E. | N.S. | N.S. | Yes | ||||
| Brazil | + | + | Yes | N.E. | + | + | + | Yes | ||||
| South Africa | + | N.S | Yes | – | + – | N.S. | N.S. | Yes | ||||
| Saudi Arabia | – | N.S. | Yes | – + – | – | N.S. | N.S. | Yes | ||||
| UAE | – | + | Yes | N.S. | – | + | + | Yes | ||||
| Iran | N.S. | + | Yes | – | N.E. | N.S. | N.S. | Yes | ||||
| Argentina | N.E. | N.S. | Yes | N.E. | N.E. | + | + | Yes | ||||
| Egypt | N.S. | N.S. | Yes | N.E. | N.E. | N.S. | N.S. | Yes | ||||
| Ethiopia | N.S. | + | Yes | N.E. | – | + | + | Yes | ||||
Comparing the long-run results of the ARDL and NARDL models in Table
To confirm our results from the NARDL model, we conduct several Wald tests only for the countries that have both positive and negative significant coefficients in the short run or the long run. For the remaining countries which have either positive or negative, short or long-run impacts, we do not conduct the Wald tests as the asymmetric relation can be deduced without the test. For the countries where the test is not carried out because both the positive and negative partial impacts are non-existent or insignificant, the acronyms N.E. and N.S. are written instead. Table
| Country | Short run | Long run | |
| China | t-statistic | Only negative | N.S. |
| Result | Asymmetry | N.S. | |
| Russia | t-statistic | Only negative | –1.562517 |
| Result | Asymmetry | Symmetry | |
| India | t-statistic | N.E. | N.S. |
| Result | N.E. | N.S. | |
| Brazil | t-statistic | Only negative | –2.031666** |
| Result | Asymmetry | Asymmetry | |
| South Africa | t-statistic | Unequal lags | N.S. |
| Result | Asymmetry | N.S. | |
| Saudi Arabia | t-statistic | Unequal lags | N.S. |
| Result | Asymmetry | N.S. | |
| UAE | t-statistic | Only negative | –1.876537* |
| Result | Asymmetry | Symmetry | |
| Iran | t-statistic | Only positive | N.S. |
| Result | Asymmetry | N.S. | |
| Argentina | t-statistic | N.E. | –5.684905*** |
| Result | N.E. | Asymmetry | |
| Egypt | t-statistic | N.E. | N.S. |
| Result | N.E. | N.S. | |
| Ethiopia | t-statistic | Only negative | –1.309782 |
| Result | Asymmetry | Symmetry |
To depict how equilibrium is restored following a shock in oil prices, we use the dynamic multipliers approach developed by
With respect to China, it is clear that a negative shock in oil prices has a greater impact on REER than the positive impact in the short run. In Russia, only the negative impact decreases REER in the short run. In India, although the NARDL estimation technique proved the positive and negative impacts of oil shocks on REER insignificant, the dynamic multiplier analysis depicts negative changes to be more impactful compared to the positive ones. However, the insignificance of the impact is apparent from the magnitude of the change (maximum change 0.010), a phenomenon also taking place in Egypt. Brazil’s REER is obviously more sensitive to negative changes in oil prices compared to positive ones, similar to the results from the NARDL analysis and the Wald test. South Africa’s alternating impact of oil price changes on REER in the short run implied from the NARDL analysis is confirmed by the dynamic multiplier analysis, especially concerning the negative shock in oil prices; a phenomenon also confirmed in Saudi Arabia, but concerning the positive changes in oil prices on REER in the short run (same implications from the NARDL analysis). In the UAE, the negative change in oil price is more impactful in the first few months of the change leading to the rise in REER; nevertheless, a more symmetric relation is apparent in the long run. In Argentina as well as in Ethiopia a long-run symmetric influence is evident, consistent with the NARDL results.
On January 1, 2024, five countries, namely Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Egypt, and Ethiopia, formally joined the BRICS agglomeration (could be titled BRICS Plus), already comprising China, Russia, India, Brazil and South Africa. Argentina was also invited to join in 2023, yet rejected the invitation later that year. In this research, we show how any variants of a unified BRICS currency are challengeable by probing the influence of only one fundamental factor — the international price of crude oil — on the REERs of the BRICS Plus member states, while differentiating between the positive and the negative shocks in the oil price on REER. Even though empirical researches on asymmetries in the effect of oil price on exchange rate in BRICS countries abound, there is no evidence in the extant literature that assesses the impact in each BRICS Plus country individually, or compares and contrasts such impact between the old and new members. In the present article, therefore, we contribute to the literature by applying
Results of the paper demonstrate that the oil price alterations seem to have an asymmetric effect on REER for the BRICS Plus members. In the short run, the asymmetric impacts of oil price changes on REER appear in all BRICS Plus countries. REER in China, Russia, Brazil, the UAE, and Ethiopia (Iran) is generally more susceptible to oil price plunges (or hikes) than to hikes (or plunges) in the short run. In the case of South Africa and Saudi Arabia, the response of REER is more complex, with the rapid alternating fluctuations accompanying any change in oil price.
In the long run, Brazil and Argentina confirmed the asymmetric impact of oil price changes on REER, while the symmetric impact of the positive and negative oil price changes is confirmed in Russia, UAE, and Ethiopia. However, it is clear from the dynamic multiplier analysis that Russia adjusts faster than the UAE and Ethiopia.
Some important policy implications for researchers and policy-makers can be deduced from our study. Researchers analyzing the link between oil prices and REER in BRICS Plus countries should be aware of the asymmetric effect of oil prices, which, if neglected, could result in spurious results. Our findings also offer several relevant policy implications for policy-makers. First, since oil price dynamics affect the short-run movements of the selected BRICS Plus members, oil price fluctuations should be considered one of the integral short-run determinants of their exchange rates. In the case where a unified monetary union was created, continuous appreciations or depreciations of the local currencies will have to be implemented to preserve the alignment of the local currencies with the composite currency unit. Furthermore, unifying their macroeconomic policies would be problematic. For example, our study has proved that in Iran only the negative changes in the oil price increases its REER. Iran may thus be interested in hindering any oil price falls (or raising its oil price) to prevent raising its REER and increase its competitiveness. Such a policy may not align with Ethiopia, for example, where positive shocks in oil prices increase its REER and decrease its export competitiveness. Second, since it is proven that an upswing in the price of crude oil appreciates the exchange rates of Russia, Brazil, the UAE, Argentina, and Ethiopia in the long run, these members would have to employ expansionary monetary policies aimed at depreciating their local currencies, and ameliorating the trade deficit. Third, in countries with fixed exchange regimes, particularly Saudi Arabia, there are no long-run exchange rate reactions to changes in oil prices, hence Saudi Arabia may need to change the level of the peg to enhance its export earnings.