Research Article |
Corresponding author: Mirzat Ullah ( mirzat.ullakh@urfu.ru ) Corresponding author: Kazi Sohag ( ksohag@urfu.ru ) © 2023 Non-profit partnership “Voprosy Ekonomiki”.
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0), which permits to copy and distribute the article for non-commercial purposes, provided that the article is not altered or modified and the original author and source are credited.
Citation:
Ullah M, Sohag K, Khan S, Sohail HM (2023) Impact of Russia–Ukraine conflict on Russian financial market: Evidence from TVP-VAR and quantile-VAR analysis. Russian Journal of Economics 9(3): 284-305. https://doi.org/10.32609/j.ruje.9.105833
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This study aims to analyze the repercussions of the Russia–Ukraine conflict on the Russian financial market, focusing on the main stock market and sectorial stock indices. High-frequency hourly data from September 12, 2021, to April 29, 2022, covering the period before and after the outbreak of conflict, is utilized for analysis. The empirical investigation employs the TVP-VAR and Quantile-VAR connectedness approaches. Our findings indicate a significant impact of the conflict on the Russian stock market, leading to increased market risk during the event period. Notably, certain sectors, including oil and gas, utilities, metals & mining, financials, consumer goods, and services exerted more influence on other sectors, while chemicals, transport, and telecoms were influenced by other sectors. These insights are crucial for comprehending the financial implications of the ongoing conflict on the local economy, providing valuable guidance to portfolio managers, investors, and policymakers in devising effective financial strategies.
Russia–Ukraine conflict, stock market index, sectorial index, TVP-VAR, quantile network connectedness estimations
The ongoing Russia–Ukraine conflict negatively impacts global stock markets. Sanctions imposed against Russia create economic setbacks, affecting local stock market. The conflict disrupts global trade relations, especially with the EU, leading to uncertainty for investors. Volatility in Russian markets further exacerbates negative impacts on listed firms, contributing to stock market fluctuations. In this study, we empirically examine the impact of the Russia–Ukraine conflict in 2022 on the Russian main and sectorial stock indices.
The impact of wars and conflicts on the stock market is well-documented in various research studies. For example,
Consequently, this study aims to analyze the impact of the ongoing conflict on the Russian stock market, along with the connectedness of major sectoral indices in several ways. Firstly, we present evidence on the time-varying parametric connectedness network model of major indices, a novel approach compared to other studies that have examined cross-commodity effects and connectedness return using diverse methods (
In this way, our study offers valuable insights for policymakers, fund managers, and investors to make informed decisions on investment options during ongoing war-crisis periods. Our key findings reveal significant changes in the Russian stock market’s connectedness and increased market risk during the conflict. Specifically, the oil and gas, electric utilities, metals & mining, financials, consumer goods, and services sectors act as net transmitters of spillovers, while chemicals, transport, and telecoms are net receivers. Following the invasion, the Russian economy experienced a substantial economic slowdown in the short term. The Russian stock market faced closures, with MOEX being shut for over a month, and many companies with shares listed abroad witnessing all-time low equity values and delisting. Additionally, the Russian ruble plummeted against the US dollar as the conflict started, further impacted by sanctions and fears of import bans (14% decline in offshore trading).
Russia’s economy could to contract in the short term as well as in the long term, as documented by recent studies (
Typically, in a war situation, both countries’ economies suffer adverse effects. However, in the case of Russia, the actual impact may differ from economists’ and opponents’ expectations (
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review relevant to our study. The subsequent section outlines the methodology, tools, and procedures utilized. Section 4 presents the empirical results and subsequent discussion. The final section concludes the study.
A growing body of literature has extensively documented the diverse impacts of international conflicts on the financial market, subsequently affecting the overall health of the economy. Most studies reveal the aggregate negative and long-term effects of war and conflict on the stock market. For instance,
Consistent with previous studies, the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine bears resemblance to the 2014 conflict, which negatively impacted not only the Russian and Ukrainian economies but also affected the entire region, including the European Union.
Furthermore,
Singh at al. (2022) investigated the effect of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine on investors’ perception of the energy, aerospace and defense, and environment, social, and governance sectors. They found increased attention towards the energy, aerospace, and defense sectors due to their growing sustainability role. Regarding the response of global financial markets to the Russia–Ukraine conflict,
In addition to the literature mentioned earlier, it is crucial to consider the trade boycott against Russia and its financial ramifications on the Russian economy. Western countries imposed sanctions and recalled multinational corporations operating in Russia, leading to a stagnant downgrade of the financial market. Consequently, the EU and other allies sought gradual independence from Russian energy products.
The impacts of the ongoing situation on stock markets have been widely investigated by policymakers, academics, investment institutions, and individuals.
Based on the existing literature, we observe a common theme of risk as a key factor in financial markets. Shocks in the market transmit associated risks, influencing the volatility and behavior of the stock market. In the context of the Russia–Ukraine tension, the Russian stock market faced heightened risk, leading to a herding effect amid the ongoing crisis. This study predicts that the Russian stock market may experience contagion and collapse if external shocks persist. Therefore, policymakers and financial market supervisors should prioritize risk assessment during crises. Scholars have empirically examined factors causing systemic financial risk.
The financial world has witnessed global outbreaks like the COVID-19 pandemic, impacting the stock market with high-frequency shocks that affect the economy. Researchers have investigated the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on the stock market. For instance,
During the crisis, excessive credit expansion was observed, leading to macroeconomic imbalances. Current crisis has several features unique to the Russian stock market, such as the herding effect in stock market, negative externalities in commodity market, and information mismatch regarding the economic policy uncertainty has contributed more uncertainty in the uprising of the systemic financial risks and risk contagion in the economy. Scholars are employing new econometric methods to investigate financial issues, including the network connectivity of different markets. The transmission of information during crises is closely related to increased uncertainty in the stock market. Researchers have studied information transmission and its impact on various markets like commodities, currency, bonds, and stocks. Studies on the network connectedness of major stock markets during global crises, such as the 2008–2009 financial crisis, China–India’s unique strategies, and the Russia–Ukraine tension, have been explored. The complex network estimations and high-dimensional dataset analysis are applied to examine the effects of crises on stock markets. Studies have shown that the effects of global financial crises vary significantly among different stock markets due to event characteristics. Risk assessment during crises is crucial for policymakers at the macro level, considering the strong correlations among financial assets and commodities. However, previous research focused more on pairwise correlation, neglecting the overall interconnectedness network and interaction correlation of financial risk with other markets, including commodity, metal, energy, and agriculture.
The global financial crisis has severely impacted financial markets worldwide, prompting numerous studies to examine the dynamic relationships across different financial markets. Researchers have investigated the dynamic relations between the US and Asia stock markets, as well as the interconnections among bond, gold, and stock markets, which vary over time and respond to market conditions, particularly during crises. Regional crises, such as the Asian currency exchange and European sovereign debt crises, have also caused financial instability and collapses of financial institutions. The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine has further exacerbated the situation, leading to significant damage to the regional economy. Scholars have explored systemic risk in European countries, examining the dynamic return and cross-connectedness for financial assets and commodities, and observing volatility spillovers between US treasury bonds and emerging markets during crisis periods. This study contributes to the literature by elucidating the impact of the Russia–Ukraine conflict on the relationship between local stock markets. The empirical findings have important implications for various stakeholders, including market participants, corporations, and individuals interested in investing in Russia’s stock markets during current situation. Given Russia’s significant role as a major exporter of agricultural commodities, such as wheat, and its substantial contribution to global exports in conjunction with Ukraine, it is evident that conflicts and wars have detrimental effects on the economy’s health and development process, especially in the stock market.
Previous studies utilized the event study estimation approach to conduct similar analyses (
Wt = Xt Wt –1 + εt where εt ~ n (0, Pt), (1)
Xt = Xt –1 + θt where θt ~ n (0, Qt), (2)
where Wt –1 denotes the lag of the dependent variable, and Xt represents the time-varying n × n element coefficient matrix, where εt and θt are disturbances explained by the (n × 1) and (n2 × n) vectors respectively. On the other hand, Pt and Qt are (n × n), and (n2 × n2) matrices, respectively, representing the time-varying variance and covariance matrices of the disturbance terms εt and θt.
To facilitate analysis, we use the World representation theorem to transform the TVP VAR model into TVP VMA (Time-Varying Vector Moving Average), enabling the application of generalized forecast error and variance decomposition (hereafter referred to as GFEVD). By doing so, variance decomposition can provide insights into the transformation of forecast errors using a moving average representation.
Furthermore, the H-step-ahead forecast partitions the error variation of a variable into distinct components represented by shocks in the system. This approach is captured by the following equation:
. (3)
Using the GFEVD approach, we can develop four different connectedness procedures, i.e., total connectedness TO others, total connectedness from others, net connectedness, and average connectedness (interconnectedness). In the below equations, i and j represent variables, δgij,t (h) shows spillover impact from variable i to j and vice versa in the case of δgij,t (h).
, (4)
, (5)
, (6)
. (7)
Similarly, graphic visualization is also provided to the structural connectedness tables where different sectors indices show nodes while the arrows show pairwise connectedness among indices.
One of the main advantages of the quantile model is that it can provide output at different levels (quantile τ) of Yt conditional on Xt (
qτ (Yt conditional on Xt) = Xt α (τ). (8)
where qτ shows the τth conditional quantile of Yt having a range between 0 and 1 while Xt shows independent variables, similarly, α (τ) denotes dependency between Xt and τth conditional quantile of Yt, which can be stated as:
. (9)
Thus the pth order of the n-variable quantile VAR procedure is:
, (10)
were Yt is the dependent variable; k (τ) denotes the n-vector of constant; εt (τ) represents quantile (τ) of the error term; αi (τ) is the lagged coefficients of the dependent valuable at quantile (τ) having i = 1, 2, ..., p. The coefficients of α ̂(τ) and k (τ) are computed given that the error terms are in line with population quantile constraint, i.e.
qτ (εt (τ)|Yt– i, ..., Yt– p) = 0. (11)
The τth conditional quantile of dependent variable Yt is provided below, which may be computed following equation by equation sequence at every quantile (τ).
. (12)
This study aims to investigate the Russian main and sectorial stock market indices, utilizing high-frequency hourly data collected between September 12, 2021 and April 29, 2022. This time frame was chosen to encompass both the period before the conflict and the period after its outbreak, allowing us to analyze the impact of the conflict on the Russian economy. The intraday hourly stock data, comprising a total of 2786 observations, were sourced from Bloomberg. We meticulously adopted the approach of utilizing the squares of return values as a proxy for volatility by following the seminal work of
Table
IMOEX | MOEXBC | RTSOG | RTSEU | RTSTL | RTSMM | RTSFN | RTSCR | RTSCH | RTSTN | |
Variance | 2919.315 | 145930.721 | 10.625 | 0.979 | 1.7 | 19.837 | 30.361 | 15.813 | 31.845 | 0.399 |
Skewness | 19.203*** | 20.143*** | 15.301*** | 19.996*** | 19.887*** | 16.872*** | 25.216*** | 20.592*** | 9.849*** | 18.632*** |
Kurtosis | 486.055*** | 495.347*** | 297.606*** | 525.565*** | 504.634*** | 361.399*** | 778.189*** | 540.844*** | 126.422*** | 457.351*** |
JB | 142.454*** | 1477.961*** | 5355.580*** | 1662.746*** | 153.972*** | 788.989*** | 363.643*** | 1760.435*** | 979.042*** | 1259.146*** |
ERS | –13.149*** | –12.359*** | –12.594*** | –14.604*** | –14.580*** | –13.477*** | –13.557*** | –13.142*** | –11.324*** | –11.697*** |
Q (10) | 195.482*** | 106.873*** | 184.704*** | 67.255*** | 47.972*** | 151.243*** | 24.652*** | 66.852*** | 350.550*** | 80.448*** |
Q2 (20) | 2.730 | 4.837 | 32.633*** | 0.645 | 0.378 | 10.463* | 0.039 | 0.862 | 155.441*** | 0.751 |
Fig.
Furthermore, Fig.
Fig.
The Russia–Ukraine conflict has renewed researchers’ attention towards monitoring financial markets for cross-market spillover effects. The relationship between financial markets has undergone changes in the aftermath of the Russia–Ukraine conflict (
Fig.
Dynamic net directional connectedness.
Notes: Results are based on a TVP-VAR model with log length of order one (AIC) and a 10 step-ahead generalized forecast error variance decomposition. Source: Authors’ calculations.
Fig.
Moreover, Fig.
Furthermore,
Moreover, we observe a comparable pattern for the RTSL, MOEXBC, and RTSCR indices, as they persistently act as net receivers of shocks. Conversely, the RTSEU exhibits a consistent role as a net transmitter. Additionally, the RTSTN, RTSMM, RTSFN, and RTSCR indices predominantly serve as net transmitters, although they occasionally assume a net receiving role for short intervals. Furthermore, our analysis indicates asymmetry in volatility spillovers among all indices, with positive and negative return spillovers being equally distributed across the indices.
The findings from the VAR return spillover analysis for the selected markets are presented in Tables
Indices | Interbank currency exchange | Blue chip index | Oil & gas | Electric utilities | Telecom | Metals & mining | Financial | Consumer goods & services | Chemicals | Transport | ??? |
IMOEX | MOEXBC | RTSOG | RTSEU | RTSTL | RTSMM | RTSFN | RTSCR | RTSCH | RTSTN | FROM | |
IMOEX | 45.29 | 6.75 | 5.81 | 5.65 | 5.69 | 6.80 | 5.56 | 5.25 | 6.45 | 6.74 | 54.71 |
MOEXBC | 6.81 | 51.84 | 4.49 | 5.66 | 6.31 | 4.67 | 4.73 | 5.57 | 4.43 | 5.49 | 48.16 |
RTSOG | 6.58 | 3.03 | 25.98 | 10.43 | 8.14 | 9.26 | 10.10 | 8.90 | 7.50 | 10.07 | 74.02 |
RTSEU | 5.86 | 3.34 | 10.35 | 23.37 | 9.26 | 9.89 | 10.65 | 9.80 | 8.06 | 9.41 | 76.63 |
RTSTL | 5.92 | 3.81 | 9.17 | 10.55 | 25.21 | 8.95 | 9.64 | 9.65 | 8.20 | 8.90 | 74.79 |
RTSMM | 6.58 | 4.15 | 10.24 | 10.13 | 7.51 | 25.09 | 10.05 | 8.65 | 7.80 | 9.80 | 74.91 |
RTSFN | 5.74 | 3.70 | 10.92 | 10.60 | 8.86 | 9.42 | 24.11 | 9.36 | 7.17 | 10.12 | 75.89 |
RTSCR | 5.48 | 4.02 | 10.18 | 10.59 | 9.64 | 8.81 | 9.76 | 24.33 | 8.18 | 9.00 | 75.67 |
RTSCH | 5.89 | 4.18 | 8.41 | 10.61 | 8.53 | 9.23 | 8.79 | 9.45 | 26.54 | 8.37 | 73.46 |
RTSTN | 6.23 | 3.62 | 10.40 | 8.58 | 7.68 | 8.50 | 9.36 | 8.84 | 7.63 | 29.17 | 70.83 |
TO | 55.11 | 36.59 | 79.96 | 82.81 | 71.61 | 75.53 | 78.65 | 75.48 | 65.42 | 77.90 | 699.06 |
Inc.Own | 100.40 | 88.43 | 105.94 | 106.19 | 96.83 | 100.62 | 102.76 | 99.81 | 91.96 | 107.07 | TCI |
NET | 0.40 | –11.57 | 5.94 | 6.19 | –3.17 | 0.62 | 2.76 | –0.19 | –8.04 | 7.07 | 69.91 |
NPT | 6.00 | 0.00 | 7.00 | 6.00 | 2.00 | 5.00 | 6.00 | 3.00 | 2.00 | 8.00 |
IMOEX | MOEXBC | RTSOG | RTSEU | RTSTL | RTSMM | RTSFN | RTSCR | RTSCH | RTSTN | FROM | |
IMOEX | 41.55 | 6.63 | 6.74 | 6.77 | 6.54 | 6.19 | 6.97 | 6.53 | 5.92 | 6.16 | 58.45 |
MOEXBC | 5.70 | 48.59 | 6.57 | 6.53 | 5.92 | 5.18 | 5.94 | 5.42 | 4.42 | 5.74 | 51.41 |
RTSOG | 7.81 | 4.50 | 23.34 | 10.68 | 8.72 | 8.37 | 10.06 | 9.69 | 6.75 | 10.09 | 76.66 |
RTSEU | 6.37 | 4.28 | 10.78 | 23.28 | 9.86 | 9.12 | 9.96 | 10.01 | 7.12 | 9.22 | 76.72 |
RTSTL | 6.99 | 5.28 | 10.20 | 10.61 | 25.64 | 9.06 | 8.59 | 8.90 | 6.20 | 8.53 | 74.36 |
RTSMM | 7.92 | 5.02 | 10.20 | 10.48 | 8.29 | 22.38 | 9.37 | 9.44 | 8.33 | 8.58 | 77.62 |
RTSFN | 7.33 | 4.45 | 10.48 | 10.57 | 8.19 | 9.15 | 24.29 | 9.89 | 6.73 | 8.93 | 75.71 |
RTSCR | 7.46 | 4.72 | 10.89 | 10.41 | 8.90 | 8.91 | 9.76 | 22.85 | 7.28 | 8.81 | 77.15 |
RTSCH | 8.85 | 4.41 | 7.89 | 9.34 | 8.23 | 9.74 | 8.16 | 8.48 | 27.20 | 7.71 | 72.80 |
RTSTN | 6.97 | 4.36 | 10.65 | 9.92 | 8.58 | 8.24 | 9.09 | 9.36 | 6.70 | 26.13 | 73.87 |
TO | 65.41 | 43.66 | 84.40 | 85.30 | 73.23 | 73.95 | 77.89 | 77.71 | 59.45 | 73.77 | 714.77 |
Inc.Own | 106.96 | 92.25 | 107.74 | 108.58 | 98.87 | 96.33 | 102.17 | 100.55 | 86.64 | 99.90 | TCI |
NET | 6.96 | –7.75 | 7.74 | 8.58 | –1.13 | –3.67 | 2.17 | 0.55 | –13.36 | –0.10 | 71.48 |
NPT | 7.00 | 1.00 | 8.00 | 8.00 | 3.00 | 3.00 | 5.00 | 6.00 | 1.00 | 3.00 |
The Russia–Ukraine conflict precipitated a sudden increase in the connectedness of financial markets, as indicated by
Moreover, MOEXBC and IMOEX are the primary recipients of spillover from other indices, closely followed by RTSCH. Concurrently, all the selected sectoral indices exhibit significant effects from the event, as indicated by
Table
Table
IMOEX | MOEXBC | RTSOG | RTSEU | RTSTL | RTSMM | RTSFN | RTSCR | RTSCH | RTSTN | FROM | |
IMOEX | 31.31 | 7.46 | 8.16 | 7.30 | 7.16 | 7.52 | 8.04 | 8.64 | 6.91 | 7.49 | 68.69 |
MOEXBC | 7.84 | 32.22 | 8.38 | 7.63 | 7.69 | 7.43 | 7.62 | 7.62 | 6.20 | 7.35 | 67.78 |
RTSOG | 7.43 | 5.11 | 19.43 | 10.54 | 9.56 | 9.58 | 10.55 | 9.97 | 7.17 | 10.65 | 80.57 |
RTSEU | 6.30 | 5.43 | 11.08 | 18.32 | 10.31 | 9.64 | 10.51 | 10.18 | 7.51 | 10.72 | 81.68 |
RTSTL | 6.92 | 5.62 | 11.01 | 10.32 | 20.39 | 9.37 | 9.72 | 9.73 | 7.12 | 9.78 | 79.61 |
RTSMM | 7.12 | 5.60 | 10.70 | 10.02 | 9.35 | 18.40 | 10.26 | 10.13 | 8.69 | 9.74 | 81.60 |
RTSFN | 6.90 | 5.43 | 10.78 | 10.40 | 9.17 | 9.72 | 19.48 | 10.46 | 7.47 | 10.19 | 80.52 |
RTSCR | 7.31 | 5.53 | 11.13 | 9.86 | 9.60 | 9.89 | 10.26 | 18.67 | 7.86 | 9.91 | 81.33 |
RTSCH | 8.18 | 5.64 | 8.86 | 9.46 | 8.76 | 9.80 | 9.71 | 9.42 | 21.06 | 9.10 | 78.94 |
RTSTN | 7.02 | 5.51 | 10.43 | 9.89 | 9.78 | 9.43 | 10.09 | 10.18 | 7.24 | 20.42 | 79.58 |
TO | 65.01 | 51.33 | 90.52 | 85.43 | 81.38 | 82.39 | 86.77 | 86.35 | 66.18 | 84.93 | 780.29 |
Inc.Own | 96.33 | 83.56 | 109.95 | 103.76 | 101.78 | 100.79 | 106.24 | 105.02 | 87.24 | 105.34 | TCI |
NET | –3.67 | –16.44 | 9.95 | 3.76 | 1.78 | 0.79 | 6.24 | 5.02 | –12.76 | 5.34 | 78.03 |
NPT | 2.00 | 0.00 | 8.00 | 5.00 | 3.00 | 4.00 | 6.00 | 8.00 | 1.00 | 8.00 |
Fig.
The information’s intensity and direction at lower quantile.
Note: The figure shows network connectedness between 10 main & sectorial indices based on 10-step-ahead forecasting horizons, quantile VAR with 200 days rolling window, and Q = 0.05. Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notably, sectors such as oil & gas (RTSOG), electric utilities (RTSEU), metals & mining (RTSMM), financial (RTSFN), transport (RTSTN), telecom (RTSTL), and consumer goods & services (RTSCR) emerge as significant sources of volatility transmission to other indices, signifying their critical role in the economy. Conversely, the MOEXBC, IMOEX, and chemicals (RTSCH) sectors are identified as net recipients of spillover, indicating that they receive higher levels of volatility. Based on these findings,
Fig.
Network connection for median quantile and number of transmitters and receivers.
Note: The figure shows network connectedness between 10 main & sectorial indices based on 10-step-ahead forecasting horizons, quantile VAR with 200 days rolling window, and Q = 0.05. Source: Authors’ calculations.
Network connection for high quantile and number of transmitters and receivers.
Note: The figure shows network connectedness between 10 main & sectorial indices based on 10-step-ahead forecasting horizons, quantile VAR with 200 days rolling window, and Q = 0.05. Source: Authors’ calculations.
Stock markets are inherently susceptible to systemic events and exhibit rapid responses to such occurrences. Just as the COVID-19 pandemic severely impacted global stock markets (
Based on the study’s results, several policy implications are recommended. Firstly, policymakers should prioritize the establishment of robust risk arrangements for stockholders and financial organizations. This measure can help mitigate the negative influence on the market and promote stability. Secondly, relevant institutions should implement sector-specific rules and oversight mechanisms to prevent market manipulation, especially within the Russian stock indices, oil and gas, electric utilities, metals and mining, financials, consumer goods, and services Thirdly, investments should be directed towards sectors that foster growth and resilience, thus reducing the economy’s dependence on sectors vulnerable to geopolitical events. Lastly, engaging in peaceful dialogues has the potential to reduce uncertainties and geopolitical risks, contributing to a more stable and resilient stock market.
This study aims to empirically analyze the potential impact of the Russia–Ukraine conflict in 2022 and the role of various sanctions on the stock market performance of Russian financial markets. We utilize main and sectorial indices to assess the individual impact of the crisis. However, it is important to acknowledge that we may have overlooked the emotional impact of this conflict on the Russian financial market, which could be considered a limitation of this study. As a future direction, we suggest investigating the influence of the diverse sanctions imposed by the West on the Russian economy. Additionally, to better measure the impact of the crisis on the Russian economy, future research could consider using the newly developed Russia–Ukraine conflict economic sanctions, News Sentiment Index (RUWES). This index incorporates data from Twitter Sentiments (TS), Google Trend (GT), Wikipedia Trend (WT), and News Sentiments (NS), which may prove beneficial in examining the impact of the Russia–Ukraine conflict on the Russian financial market.