Research Article
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Article title
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Abstract
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Keywords
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1. Introduction
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2. Literature review
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3. The model
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3.1. The intuition
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3.2. Assumptions
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3.3. Values of strategies
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A. Not collude or cooperate (N)
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B. Collude and not reveal (CNR)
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C. Collude and reveal (CR)
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D. Deviate and not reveal (DNR)
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E. Deviate and reveal (DR)
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F. Cooperate and not reveal (COOPNR)
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G. Cooperate and reveal (COOPR)
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3.4. Subgame perfect equilibria
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4. Results and discussion
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4.1. Characterization of subgame perfect equilibria
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4.2. Impact of type I errors
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4.3. Effect of leniency on the incentives to cooperate
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5. Discussion
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5.1. Leniency and corruption
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5.2. Leniency and compliance
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6. Conclusions
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Acknowledgements
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To find the subgame perfect equilibria, we need to find the conditions for α and p that make each of the strategies dominant
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References