Leniency programs and socially beneficial cooperation: Effects of type I errors

Research Article

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Article title
Abstract
Keywords
1. Introduction
2. Literature review
3. The model
- 3.1. The intuition
- 3.2. Assumptions
- 3.3. Values of strategies
  - A. Not collude or cooperate (N)
  - B. Collude and not reveal (CNR)
  - C. Collude and reveal (CR)
  - D. Deviate and not reveal (DNR)
  - E. Deviate and reveal (DR)
  - F. Cooperate and not reveal (COOPNR)
  - G. Cooperate and reveal (COOPR)
- 3.4. Subgame perfect equilibria
4. Results and discussion
- 4.1. Characterization of subgame perfect equilibria
- 4.2. Impact of type I errors
- 4.3. Effect of leniency on the incentives to cooperate
5. Discussion
- 5.1. Leniency and corruption
- 5.2. Leniency and compliance
6. Conclusions
Acknowledgements
To find the subgame perfect equilibria, we need to find the conditions for α and p that make each of the strategies dominant
References